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Gender in Metamorphosis 
‘Metamorphosis’ implies fluidity, liminality and processes of change.  As a scientific 
term, it characterises the abrupt biological development of a species after hatching or 
birth.  This idea of an in-between space or state, of growth, transition and 
transformation has captured the imagination of philosophers, poets and writers 
throughout history.  In rejecting essentialist fixed identity categories, feminist scholars 
too have sought to understand how gender intersects with other identities, paying 
attention to how these are performed in and through gendered bodies. 
 
This journal represents a metamorphosis for Sibéal. The evolvement of a network that 
has provided support and space for researchers in gender and feminist studies to 
discuss and collaboration for 10 years is important. The publication of this journal is a 
new departure, a new extension of the reach of the network, providing a much needed 
publishing platform for post-graduates and early career researchers. Our network 
continues to grow, and as a result we are expanding to meet the needs of researchers. 
This publication has come about because of the hard work and contribution of 
members in order to support the important research undertaken in gender and feminist 
studies. Sibéal continues to metamorphosis because of members’.  
 
Our first journal represents the wide reach of Sibéal, with contributions on consent and 
its construction in rape trials, Beowulf, Frankenstein, and mental health in 
contemporary Irish Literature. The quality of the contributions we received is a 
testament to the need for this annual journal. The Sibéal Journal will be space for 
researchers to develop their work, to be supported by others in their field, and to 
collaborate on new developments in Gender Studies and Feminist research. Get-
Involved: The call for papers for our 2017 journal is at the end of this journal.  
 
 








Consent and its Construction in Rape Trials in Ireland: A Feminist 
Analysis1   
 
Sarah Bryan O’Sullivan2 
 
Within the criminal law context in general, the issue of consent has proven a contentious 
concept.  However, nowhere has this concept proven more problematic than in relation to the 
offence of rape.  A number of aggravating factors may be identified in this regard.  Due to the 
broad and multi-faceted nature of the term ‘consent’, a satisfactory definition of the concept 
appears to have remained elusive, with the legislature in a number of common law jurisdictions 
failing to provide a statutory definition of the term.  The issue is further complicated by the fact 
that the legitimacy of sexual intercourse hinges on two factors, both of which are directly 
concerned with consent – ‘whether the complainant in a rape trial actually consented to the 
sexual intercourse and… whether the defendant understood the complainant to be consenting’ 
(Cowan, 2007: 54).  However, undoubtedly one of the major criticisms in relation to consent in 
the offence of rape is its construction.  The manner in which the offence of rape is constructed 
in law has influenced how it is defined and how its presence or absence is interpreted.  This 
issue has led to heated debate, with many commentators pointing to the (ultimately 
problematic) construction of consent as a significant aggravating factor in rape trail convictions.  
Indeed, the construction of the concept of consent in these cases allows for clear distinctions to 
be drawn between rape and other criminal offences, adding weight to the argument that the 
construction of consent in rape cases is particularly problematic.  Hence, given the problematic 
nature of the term, the centrality of the concept in respect to the offence itself and the issues 
surrounding its construction, the contention which exists in this area is not surprising. 
This paper will present an overview of the various issues surrounding the construction of 
consent in the offence of rape.  First, consent and the origins of the common law offence of 
rape will be addressed.  The manner in which consent is constructed and subsequently 
interpreted will then be outlined, before moving on to consider the feminist analysis of this 
construction.  Finally, prior to concluding, the current position in this jurisdiction will be 
assessed and the potential for reform will be evaluated.  
 
Consent and the Common Law Offence of Rape – Origins  
Historically, Blackstone defined rape as ‘the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against 
her will’ (Blackstone, 1809).  Undoubtedly this definition of rape fed into the culturally 
engendered implication, which has (arguably) only been dispelled in recent decades, before 
which time a complainant had to show physical resistance in order to prove a lack of consent.  
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 As will be outlined, in Ireland the offence of rape, as provided for under section 2 of the Criminal Law (Rape) 
Act 1981 (as amended by the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990) is a gendered offence, it can only be 
committed by a man against a woman.  Nevertheless, the author is fully conscious of the fact that sexual 
violence can be inflicted upon male and female victims by male or female offenders.  However, as Hanly et al 
note, ‘All the available evidence…indicates that men and women do not face an equal threat of sexual 
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However, as O’Malley notes, with the abolition of capital punishment for rape in 1841 there 
emerged a clear willingness on the part of the judiciary to widen the definition of rape, allowing 
for the offence to have occurred where intercourse took place with a woman who did not 
consent, as opposed to intercourse with a woman ‘against her will’ (O’Malley, 1996: 36).  
Fortunately, due to increased pressure, campaigning and consciousness-raising by various 
victim advocacy groups, this is now the accepted view, both from a case law and legislative 
perspective.3 
 
In the Irish jurisdiction the definition of the offence of rape is to be found in section 2(1) of the 
Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, as amended by the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 
1990. The provision provides; 
(1) A man commits rape if: 
(a) He has sexual intercourse with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not 
consent to it; and 
(b) At the time he knows that she does not consent or he is reckless as to whether she 
does or does not consent to it, and reference to rape in this Act and other enactments shall be 
construed accordingly. 
 
In this section, which was modelled almost exclusively on its corresponding provision in 
England and Wales, consent is an element of both the actus reus of the offence, contained in 
section 2(1)(a), and the mens rea of the offences, as outlined in section 2(1)(b).4  
 
In relation to the mens rea element (or mental intent element) of the offence, the test to be 
applied when assessing culpability is a subjective one.  Consequently, the defendant’s belief in 
the complainant’s consent does not have to be an objectively reasonable belief; it merely has to 
be an honestly held one.  The subjective test can be traced to the House of Lords decision in 
DPP v Morgan.  In this case a majority of the House of Lords held that a man who has sexual 
intercourse with a woman without her consent cannot be convicted of rape if he honestly 
believed she was consenting.  As per Lord Hailsham, the court held that; 
 
…the prohibited act is and always has been intercourse without the consent of the 
victim and the mental element is and always has been the intention to commit that 
act, or the equivalent intention of having intercourse willy-nilly not caring whether the 
victim consents or not.  A failure to prove this involves an acquittal because the 
intent, an essential ingredient is lacking.  It matters not why it is lacking if only it is not 
there, and in particular it matters not that the intention is lacking only because of a 
belief not based on reasonable grounds (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan 
[1976] AC 182, 215) 
 
Despite the controversy caused by this judgment, following the recommendations of the 
Heilbron Committee (1975) the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 was enacted in 
England and Wales, giving legislative effect to the decision in Morgan.  By 1981 the relevant 
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 Criminal offences generally consist of two elements: the physical element (the actus reus) and the mental 
intent element (mens rea). Generally speaking, in order to find a person guilty of an offence both elements of 
the offence must be proven.  Therefore, in the case of rape the prosecution must prove that the accused 
engaged in sexual intercourse with a woman who did not consent and that he knew she was not consenting or 
was reckless as whether she was or was not consenting.  
provision of the 1976 Act was replicated in this jurisdiction by section 2(1)(b) of the Criminal 
Law Rape Act 1981, with much of the rest of the common law world also following suit.5  
 
The Construction of Consent in the Offence of Rape 
As highlighted above, the rape trial ‘hinges on two crucial issues’, both of which are directly 
concerned with consent: ‘on the fact of non-consent on the part of the victim and on the 
defendant’s state of mind or belief about whether the victim was consenting’ (Wells and Quick, 
2010: 506). Referring to consent and the manner in which it is interpreted in rape trials, the 
feminist criminologist, Carol Smart stated, ‘[i]n practice it would seem that consent is assumed 
and the raped woman must prove non-consent’ (Smart, 1989: 33).  
From a legal perspective, the necessity to prove non-consent is not unique to the offence of 
rape (McAuley and McCutcheon, 2000: 505).  Within the criminal law there are a number of 
offences which require non-consent to be proven by the prosecution in order for a defendant to 
be convicted. For example, the offence of theft under section 4 of the Criminal Justice (Theft 
and Fraud Offence) Act 2001 provides; 
a person is guilty of theft if he or she dishonestly appropriates property without the 
consent of its owner and with the intention of depriving its owner of it (Emphasis 
added)  
Similarly, section 2 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 states; 
2. (1) A person shall be guilty of the offence of assault who, without lawful excuse, 
intentionally or recklessly—   
(a) directly or indirectly applies force to or causes an impact on the body of another, 
or 
(b) causes another to believe on reasonable grounds that he or she is likely 
immediately to be subjected to any such force or impact, 
without the consent of the other (Emphasis added) 
Due to the presumption of innocence afforded to the accused in criminal trials and the burden 
of proof which is placed upon the prosecution, non-consent is one of the elements of the above 
offences which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution in order to 
secure a conviction.  While comparisons cannot be drawn between the offences themselves, 
some similarities can be seen in the necessity for the prosecution to prove non-consent in 
offences of theft and assault and a similar necessity in relation to the offence of rape.  
However, there are a number of aspects of consent within the context of the offence of rape 
which differentiate it significantly from other criminal offences.  
First, consent, or a lack thereof, is an element which is integral to both the actus reus and mens 
rea of the offence of rape in a manner which is distinctive from the above offences.  Thus, in 
order for a conviction for rape to be secured, the prosecution must prove that the complainant 
did not consent and that the defendant believed the act to be non-consensual.  Second, in 
comparison to the victim of a theft or assault, the complainant in a rape trial is forced to play a 
significant and extremely burdensome role in proving non-consent, often resulting in a close 
scrutiny of her present and past behaviour.  As Temkin and Krahe (2008: 33) comment, ‘there 
is probably no other criminal offence that is as intimately related to…evaluations of the victim’s 
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conduct as sexual assault’.  This is particularly evident in relation to the scrutiny directed at the 
victim’s sexual history.  The burdensome role placed on the victim and the degree of scrutiny 
which she is subjected to is linked to the pivotal aspect of consent in rape trials which 
significantly differentiates it from other criminal offences.  It is the manner in which consent is 
constructed in relation to the offence of rape which distinctively differentiates it.  The law’s 
construction of consent within the context of rape is shaped by myths, stereotypes and 
prejudices about the offence of rape and the victims of the offence.  The interpretation of 
consent through the lenses of these various prejudices, myths and stereotypes results in a 
construction of consent which is unique to the offence of rape.  Hence, it is on the basis of its 
interpretation and construction that Smart stated that consent is assumed, leaving non-consent 
to be proven by the rape victim.  Needless to say, this construction has proven problematic 
from a social, cultural and legal perspective. Many feminist writers and commentators have 
contributed significantly to the analysis of this issue.  Consequently, an examination of the 




For many feminist academics the notion of consent, particularly in the context of the offence of 
rape, is a fundamentally flawed concept as it ignores the argument that ‘consent is a 
communication under conditions of inequality’ (MacKinnon, 1989: 182).  As a result of this 
inherent defect, it is contended that any attempts at reformulating consent will only result in the 
manipulation of the concept, as opposed to offering any meaningful redress.  While this 
contention speaks to broader issues relating to gender inequality and societal constructs 
generally, feminist analysis of the construction of consent in the offence of rape argues that in 
order to comprehensively assimilate the criminal law’s construction of consent in this regard, it 
is necessary to consider this construction in the context of the entrenched beliefs about female 
sexuality in a phallocentric culture.  In a culture which is structured to ‘meet the needs of the 
masculine imperative’, Smart (1989: 27-32) refers to the pathologising of female sexuality.  
Through such a process women’s sexuality is presented as something which is detached from 
them (Smart, 1989: 28-32).  The pathologising of female sexuality supports the socially 
accepted belief that women’s sexual responsiveness is fickle, unpredictable and often passive 
and consequently, because women are not fully aware of their own sexual responsiveness and 
desires, it is thought possible that such desires could manifest in the most unlikely of situations 
(Smart, 1989: 31). 
 
A repercussion of the construction of female sexuality as problematic results in a focus on the 
male perspective of what is relevant in relation to the construction of consent.  Feminist 
theorists argue that the law in general is constructed from a male perspective; however this is 
particularly problematic in relation to rape law given the gendered nature of the offence.  The 
consent/non-consent dyad, which is deemed relevant in (male-constructed) legal terms, can be 
‘completely irrelevant to women’s experience’ (Smart, 1989: 33).  As a result, the law often 
precludes the woman’s experience.  This is particularly evident in relation to the concept of 
submission in rape trials (Smart, 1989: 34).  While it is now recognised that not every 
submission involves consent6, in reality a woman may submit without truly consenting but fail to 
reach the requisite threshold for non-consent.  Hence, it is on this basis that commentators 
have concluded that ‘the only alternative when non-consent is not established is to presume 
consent – and hence the innocence of the accused’ (Smart, 1989: 34). 
 
The subjective approach to the mens rea element of the offence further promotes the male 
standpoint by requiring consideration of the event as the man (honestly) believed it to be 
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(Bridgeman and Millns, 1998: 400).  Absence of consent is not sufficient to satisfy the mens rea 
of the offence of rape.  What in fact is required is absence of consent, coupled with the male’s 
belief in that absence, a belief which does not need to meet any requirement of 
reasonableness.  Such an approach significantly limits any space for the consideration of the 
woman’s consent. As Duncan states; 
 
There is no space for the female subject’s consent, no space for the female 
subject…she cannot consent, she cannot desire, she can only mirror – mirror his 
unreasonable beliefs, whatever her actions or her words, he can sustain that belief 
(1994: 3) 
 
The side-lining of the woman’s consent is troubling from a social, cultural and legal perspective.  
It brings into question the concept of ‘the policy of the law’ and what it is we want the law to 
reflect in terms of what we consider to be socially unacceptable forms of behaviour (Bridgeman 
and Millns, 1998: 405).  The importance of the role played by the law in this respect is 
commented on by Smart who notes; 
 
In the denial of women’s accounts law is not unique, but arguably it is a particularly 
important forum. This is because legal decisions affect many individual women, but 
the law also sets and resets the parameters within which rape is dealt with more 
generally in society (1989: 26) 
 
In this respect, it is arguable that the shortcomings of the law greatly contribute to the low 
reporting rates, the no-criming statistics and the overall prevalence of ‘rape culture’ in society.7  
 
This policy argument feeds into what feminists have described as the ‘symbolic importance of 
criminalising unreasonable mistakes in the belief as to consent’ and the dangers which can 
emerge when such symbolism is neglected (Cowan, 2007: 60).8  This issue is aptly surmised 
by Duncan who refers to the ‘permission’ created by the law as a result of the subjectivity 
employed when assessing the male belief in consent, a subjectivity that is denied in relation to 
the construction of the complainant’s consent; 
 
While consent lies within his honest belief, the realm of his desire, her desire remains 
unsymbolised, unrepresented.  Subjectivity denied, she is granted no desire. If she 
had subjectivity, the legal text would not test for her consent but for her desire.  While 
the law purports to forbid rape, it creates a permission in the mirror which reflects the 
male subject and his desire – not the rational male subject but the sexual, embodied, 
desiring male subject (1994: 29) 
 
Therefore, the construction of consent in relation to the offence of rape has led to the 
development of a legal process which does not adequately acknowledge the true experience of 
the rape victim.  Such a construction has the potential to negate criminal liability, regardless of 
whether consent was absent.  It is this inadequate and often irrelevant construction of consent 
in relation to the offence of rape which distinctively differentiates it from other criminal offences 
and results in a series of contentious and problematic issues in rape trials.  
 
Ireland – The Current Position and the Potential for Reform 
As outlined above, there is no statutory definition of consent in this jurisdiction and the 
subjective approach to the mens rea element of the offence has been firmly established in 
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Ireland since the enactment of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 (O’Malley, 2013: 58-59).  
Both these issues have proven extremely contentious, particularly among victim advocacy and 
support groups (Rape Crisis Network Ireland, 2008a, 2008b).  
Following the controversial 1981 Act, an opportunity arose for the Law Reform Commission 
(1987:  para. 64) to address the issue of consent in rape offences in the late 1980’s.  Initially, 
the 1987 consultation paper issued by the Commission stated that they ‘were not aware of any 
problems having arisen as a result of the non-definition of consent’ and therefore 
recommended that the law be left as it stood (Law Reform Commission, 1987: para. 64).  
However, a year later the Commission seemed to have a change of heart.  They stated that 
certain victim support groups were ‘strongly of the opinion that the absence of a definition had 
influenced verdicts’ and accordingly they felt it would be ‘advantageous if the legislature were to 
clarify the law’ (Law Reform Commission, 1988: para. 16).  Hence, they recommended that 
consent be defined as ‘a consent freely and voluntarily given’ and they called for the enactment 
of legislation which would place this definition on a statutory footing (Law Reform Commission, 
1988: para. 17). 
However, in relation to the mens rea element of the offence the Law Reform Commission were 
not to be swayed from their original position, as established in the consultation paper. The 
commission rejected the proposition of substituting an objective test for the one laid down in 
section 2(2) of the 1981 Act. The commission stated; 
We have not been persuaded by any argument that has been advanced to us that we 
were wrong in our original conclusion that the provisions of section 2 (2) represents a 
fair and workable test in a difficult area. We accordingly adhere to our original 
recommendation that no change be made (Law Reform Commission, 1988: para. 
21). 
Following this report by the LRC, the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 was 
enacted.  While the 1990 Act followed many of the recommendations advanced by the 
commission, its suggested definition of consent was omitted.  Thus, neither the mens rea 
element nor the absence of a definition of consent were addressed by the 1990 Act. 
Since the 1990 Act there have been repeated calls for reform that would provide a definition of 
consent and would help to clarify and modernise the law.  Victim advocates and academics 
alike have vehemently highlighted the need for change.  The RCNI have repeatedly issued 
publications illustrating this gap in the law and seeking legislative action to rectify the situation 
(RCNI, 2005:4; RCNI, 2008a: 15). Leahy has highlighted on a number of occasions the 
necessity for a ‘clear statement of what constitutes a legally acceptable consent to sexual 
activity’ which would need to be ‘supported by a reconsideration of the honest belief defence 
which currently provides that a defendant cannot be convicted of rape if he honestly believed 
that the woman was consenting’ (2013a).    
It was hoped that the long-awaited review of Irish sexual offences law, which has to date 
culminated in the publication of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Bill 2015, would rectify the 
omissions of the 1990 Act in respect to the issue of consent.  Unfortunately, the 2015 Bill 
appears to fall short.  Indeed, from the outset it seemed the proposed legislation would fail to 
fulfil the hopes of advocates calling for clarification and modernisation of the law on consent.  
The Law Reform Commission’s (2013) consultation paper, entitled Sexual Offences and 
Capacity to Consent (which preceded the 2015 Bill), was predominantly concerned with the 
capacity to consent as opposed to defining consent itself, and consequently no 
recommendation was made in this respect.  Thus, it is evident that despite sustained calls for 
reform, the Irish legislature appears to have no immediate intentions to revise this issue.  
Leahy (2013b, 2014) ultimately advocates the introduction of a positive statutory definition of 
consent in Irish law and a reformulated model of the mens rea element of the offence of rape 
which incorporates an objective element to the construction of belief in consent.  Despite a 
number of shortcomings, the English Sexual Offences Act 2003 can provide significant 
guidance in this context.  The 2003 Act provides a legislative definition of the term ‘consent’9 
and introduces a reasonableness element to belief in consent.10  While an analysis of the 
provisions contained in the 2003 Act is beyond the scope of this article, the English legislation 
offers a persuasive ‘template for reform’ in Ireland which is worthy of close consideration 
(Leahy, 2014: 232).11 
 
Conclusion 
It is beyond doubt that in the context of rape law, the concept of consent is a particularly 
contentious one.  The problematic nature of the concept and of its construction is reflected in 
the difficulties encountered when attempting to effectively legislate in this area.  These issues 
are further exacerbated by the ubiquitous nature of consent in relation to the offence of rape.  
Attempts to reform and reconstruct this aspect of the law have been widely debated, with 
various reformulations and alternatives being suggested.  As highlighted, commentators have 
suggested that the root of the problems associated with consent lie in the fact that it is a 
concept which is not equipped to appropriately address the relevant issues in such cases.  
Indeed, from the perspective of a feminist analysis of this issue, there appears to be strong 
support for this argument.  Consequently, the ill-equipped concept of consent, coupled with its 
problematic construction, has resulted in modernisation of the law in this area proving a slow 
and arduous task, with much remaining to be achieved.  
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The Monster in the House: Grendel’s Mother and the Victorian Ideal 
 
Alison Elizabeth Killilea 
 
Beowulf is the only surviving heroic epic in the Old English language, and is consequently 
one of the most important works from the Anglo-Saxon period.  It tells the story of the 
Geatish warrior Beowulf and his expedition to King Hrothgar’s kingdom in Denmark in order 
to rid the realm of the cannibalistic Grendel.  Beowulf’s successful encounter with Grendel 
leads to the second battle of the poem, in which Grendel’s mother, whom this article focuses 
on, seeks revenge for the death of her son.  After taking the life of one of the Danes in 
exchange for that of Grendel, she is followed by Beowulf to her cave and eventually killed.  
The poem ends fifty years later with Beowulf’s fatal battle against the dragon.   
The figure of Grendel’s mother, Beowulf’s second adversary in the tale, has, since the 
beginning of the poem’s translation history, been characterised as a monstrous figure, a 
‘great sea-demon woman’ (Morgan, 1952: I.1519) and an ‘inhuman troll-wife’ (Tolkien, 2014: 
I.1780).  She is generally portrayed as a witch-like or reptilian figure in artistic and literary 
depictions, for instance in John Gardner’s novel Grendel, where she is described as a ‘fat, 
foul . . .long-suffering hag’ (1972: 3-5), in Sturla Gunnarsson’s film release Beowulf and 
Grendel (2005), and in Gareth Hinds’s The Collected Beowulf (2000), among numerous 
others.  Very few exceptions to this consistent portrayal of her as a monstrous being exist, 
and although Graham Baker’s (1999) and Robert Zemeckis’s (2007) Beowulf adaptations 
choose to depict her as a beautiful seductress, it is clear that her aesthetic beauty is a 
disguise for her ‘true’ monstrous form, and indeed, these films also end up demonising 
female sexuality in addition to Grendel’s mother’s particular character.  
In a reconsideration of the Old English of the poem, however, it may be argued that this 
traditional depiction of Grendel’s mother is in fact disputable, and it has been previously 
disputed by a small number of scholars, including Christine Alfano (1992) and M.W. 
Hennequin (2008).  Alfano uses her paper to highlight the subjective nature of translation in 
Beowulf and analyses a small number of terms specific to Grendel’s mother, while 
Hennequin’s work aims to construct her character as a warrior figure, ‘a noblewoman and 
brave opponent’ who was admired by the poet (2008: 513). Although Alfano speculates 
about the beginnings of Grendel’s mother’s demonization, the issue is only touched on in the 
form of a footnote and is not pursued any further.  Similarly, although Hennequin challenges 
the traditional view of her character, its beginnings are not explored.  Through expanding on 
these scholars’ works and further analysing the terms used to describe Grendel’s mother’s 
character, as well as exploring the formation of her monstrous identity, my broader research 
aims to argue against the traditional view of her character as a ‘monstrous ogress’ 
(Alexander, 1973: 1259) and support the view of her character as a human figure. 
Being an Anglo-Saxon poem written sometime between the eighth- and eleventh-centuries 
in Old English, Beowulf is accessible to the majority of readers only through the means of 
translation, or through the use of dictionaries or glossaries.  This, in practice, means that the 
representations of characters within the poem are majorly dependant on popular 
translations.  This poses a problem, the translated work never having absolute equivalence 
with its subject language, a point which has been variously argued from Cicero in the first 
century BCE, through to Roman Jakobson and Eugene Nida in the twentieth century.12  As 
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 Marcus Tullius Cicero was the first to bring into debate the issues of ‘word-for-word’ versus ‘sense-for-sense’ 
translation in the 1
st
 century BCE. Horace, in the same century, shared Cicero’s preference of a ‘sense-for-sense’ 
Nida argues, ‘since no two languages are identical . . . it stands to reason that there can be 
no absolute correspondence between languages. Hence there can be no fully exact 
translation’ (1964: 156).  This point is especially relevant for an ancient and obsolete 
language like Old English, which not only differs linguistically from Modern English, but also 
applies to a different culture and context.  John D. Niles stresses the importance of 
identifying language as a system which evolves according to the changing ‘social matrix in 
which it is embedded’ (1993: 862), and recognising that translations, dictionaries and 
glossaries should not be taken for granted or ever be treated as an exact record of what the 
original text says.  
Nowhere in Beowulf is the subjective nature of translation more clearly evident than in the 
case of Grendel’s mother.  Through a reassessment of the poem in its original Old English, 
there appears to be much at odds with Modern English translations of numerous terms used 
in descriptions of her character.  The most infamous of these terms is ides aglæcwif 
(Klaeber, 1950: I.1259)13, a much debated phrase translated variously as ‘monstrous hell-
bride’ (Heaney, 2000: l.1259), ‘monster of a woman’ (Klaeber, 1950: 298) and as ‘ogress, 
fierce destroyer in the form of a woman’ (Tolkien, 2014: l.1045).  The stem of aglæcwif, 
aglæca, is also used of Grendel, where it is given similar translations,14 but more 
significantly, it is used also of Beowulf and of the legendary warrior Sigemund, where it is 
translated as ‘fearsome warrior’ (Chickering, 1977: l.1259) and ‘great warrior’ (Donaldson, 
1975: l.1259).  It seems quite radical that a definition of a word should be altered in specific 
cases, and doing so ‘completely ignores the possibility that the poet has deliberately chosen 
to use the same word to describe two sets of characters’ (O’Brien O’Keeffe, 1981: 485).  In a 
study of over thirty of the instances of aglæca in the Old English corpus Sherman Kuhn 
concluded that a more accurate translation of the term would be ‘fighter, valiant warrior, 
dangerous opponent, one who struggles fiercely’ (1979: 218).15  Kuhn argues that aglæcwif, 
referring to Grendel’s mother, should simply be translated as ‘female warrior’ (1979: 218).  
Such a translation has been supported by numerous scholars, including E.G Stanley (1979) 
and Christine Alfano (1992), and the Dictionary of Old English (2007) cites it as an accepted 
translation, as opposed to translations along the lines of Donaldson’s ‘monster-wife’ and 
Chickering’s ‘monster woman’.  Despite this generally accepted translation of aglæcwif as 
‘female warrior’, the term is still regularly translated in monstrous terms in modern 
translations, like Heaney’s and Chickering’s, with any humanity or admiration that the term 
may suggest being ignored. 
Following on from Kuhn’s interrogation of aglæca and aglæcwif, I examine two more terms, 
wif unhyre and laþan fingrum, which have not been given the attention that aglæcwif and 
other terms have received.  I then explore the possible origins of the more demonic 
translations of these words.  Like aglæcwif, wif unhyre (Klaeber, 1950: I.2120) is a contested 
term in Beowulf, with various translations of ‘ghastly dam’ (Heaney, 2000: l.2120), ‘the 
gruesome she’ (Alexander, 1973: l.2120) and ‘inhuman troll-wife’ (Tolkien, 2014: l.1780).  
The neuter noun wif appears countless times throughout the Old English corpus, and is 
                                                                                                                                                  
rendering, underlining the goal of producing an aesthetically pleasing text. See Jeremy Munday, Introducing 
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 For example, ‘monster’ (Heaney, 2000: l. 433), ‘demon’ (Morgan, 1952: l. 433), and ‘creature’ (Liuzza 2000: l. 
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 Elliot van Kirk Dobbie (1953) was the first to suggest that aglæca needed no more of a specific translation than 
‘formidable one’. 
overwhelmingly translated as ‘woman’ or ‘wife,’ with Melinda Menzer arguing that ‘wif alone 
always refers to a human woman, rather than a female being’ (1996: 3).16  
Unhyre also does not necessarily imply monstrosity, as many translators have interpreted.  
Rather, I argue for a translation of unhyre as ‘awful’, ‘fierce’, or ‘cruel’, staying consistent with 
other appearances of the word.  As well as its appearance in describing Grendel’s mother in 
Beowulf17, it is contained in Genesis A, in a description of Ishmael - Se bið unhyre, 
orlæggifre, wiðerbreca wera cneorissum, ‘he shall be rough, warlike, hostile to the races of 
men’ (Mason, 1915: I.2287).18  It also appears in An Old English Martyrology describing an 
unhyran cwelres, a ‘grim executioner’ (Rauer, 2014: I.184.9).  Unhiore, another form of the 
word, is used by Boethius in describing ‘rough’ or ‘fierce’ weather19 and there also exists the 
possibility that unhyre is related to the Old Icelandic u-hýrr, translating as ‘frowning’ or 
‘unfriendly looking’ (Cleasby and Vigfusson 1874: 661).  
An examination of unhyre’s antonym, hyre (or alternatively heoru or heore) can also aid us 
with a better understanding of the term.  Hyre is translated by Bosworth and Toller as 
‘gentle, mild, pleasant’ and by Clark-Hall (2011) as ‘pleasant, secure, peaceful, gentle, mild, 
pure, spotless’.  It appears in Beowulf on line 1372, Nis ðæt heoru stow, ‘that was not a 
pleasant place’, and in Genesis A, Culufre fotum stop on beam hyre, ‘the gentle bird stepped 
with her feet on a tree’ (Hostetter, 2011: I.1466).  In the case that hyre is an antonym for 
unhyre, a definition of ‘awful’, ‘fierce’, or ‘grim’ makes more sense than ‘monstrous’, 
‘gruesome’ or ‘inhuman’.  Consequently, wif unhyre could accurately, and more consistently, 
be translated as ‘grim -’ or ‘fierce woman’, as opposed to the monstrous translations 
traditionally put forward.  
Despite the rather vivid imagery associated with Grendel’s mother in translations, 
adaptations, and artistic representations, there is very little reference to her physical 
appearance in the poem.  Besides the description of her as ides onlicnes, ‘in the likeness of 
a woman’, (Klaeber, 1950: l.1351) there are only brief references to her physical 
appearance, one such term referring to her laþan fingrum (Klaeber, 1950: I.1505).  This term 
has, like wif unhyre and aglæcwif, received majorly negative and bestial translations, from 
‘savage talons’ (Heaney, 2000: l.1505) to ‘hostile claws’ (Liuzza, 2000: l.1505).  However, 
fingrum’s rather straightforward and most widely accepted translation is simply ‘[with] 
fingers’, and is consistently translated as such throughout the rest of the Old English corpus, 
for example, in Ælfric’s Lives of Saints and Cynewulf’s Christ.20  It appears also in numerous 
Old English sources in reference to the finger of God, such as in Ælfric’s Homilies, making a 
translation of ‘claws’ or ‘talons’ rather unlikely.  As for laþan, this is most likely related to 
Modern English ‘loathing’ or ‘hateful’, or alternatively ‘hated’ (Clark-Hall, 2011), and appears 
numerous times in Beowulf, such as on line 2910, leofes ond laðes, ‘the loved and the hated’ 
(Chickering, 1977: l.2910), and on lines 814-5, wæs gehwæþer oðrum lifigende lað, ‘it was 
hateful to each other that the other lived’ (Chickering, 1977: ll.814-5).  As such, instead of a 
translation of ‘savage talons’ or ‘hostile claws’, a more consistent translation of laþan fingrum 
would be ‘hated-’ or ‘hateful fingers’. 
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 Numerous Beowulf  translations, such as Tolkien’s and Alexander’s translate fingrum as ‘fingers’. 
Aglæcwif, wif unhyre and laþan fingrum, are only a small selection of the many terms 
describing Grendel’s mother, most of which can be reasonably translated in human terms, 
rather than the monstrous and bestial translations that are overwhelmingly used.  Assuming 
that Grendel’s mother’s character can be read in more humanised terms, this begs the 
question of why this demonization of her began.  Unlike her son, she is never depicted as 
evil21 and is also never described as an eoten or a þyrs, both of which are generally 
translated as ‘giant’.22  Also unlike her son, her actions are never criticised by the poet or by 
characters within the poem, rather her actions are accepted as part of the blood-feud – King 
Hrothgar notes that heo þa fæhðe wræc þe þu gystran niht Grendel cwealdest (Klaeber, 
1950: II.1333-4), ‘she avenged that feud in which, last night, you killed Grendel,’ and Beowulf 
himself recognises that she hyre bearn gewræc (Klaeber, 1950: I.2121), ‘avenged her son.’23  
As Kevin Kiernan argues ‘she accepted and adhered to the heroic ethic of the blood-feud . . . 
her single attack on Heorot had the best of motives, vengeance for the death of her kinsman 
Grendel’ (1984: 24).  The fact that she is the mother of a son who has explicitly evil (and 
arguably monstrous) traits does not warrant such monstrous translations of her own 
character, nor does the fact that she is an antagonist justify her traditional depiction as a 
‘monstrous ogress’. 
The first concrete beginnings of Anglo-Saxon scholarship can be traced back to the Victorian 
era, with the first transcriptions of Beowulf being published by Grimúr Thorkelin in 1815, and 
the first translations into English appearing with Sharon Turner’s interpretation of a number 
of passages from the poem in 1805.  Berit Åström argues that in the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth- centuries history was viewed in a linear fashion; that is, it was believed that 
civilisation was continuously progressing ‘from an obscure and primitive past to an 
enlightened and highly cultivated present’ (1998: 25).  He argues that in these centuries 
Anglo-Saxon culture was presumed to revolve around masculinity, military might, power, and 
status, with little concern for women’s’ experiences, resulting in women’s experiences being 
of little interest to the scholars of the Victorian period.  Similarly Damico and Olsen assert 
that ‘nineteenth-century studies of the Anglo-Saxon period (as of other literary eras) were 
androcentic, written by males for a male audience from a male perspective and experience’ 
(1990: 12).  It wasn’t until the latter half of the twentieth century, with the advent of the 
feminist movement, that the experiences of Anglo-Saxon women were given much attention.  
Besides this lack of interest in Anglo-Saxon women’s lives and experiences, the Victorian 
period is considered to have held a narrow view of femininity and was particularly notorious 
for its regulation of women.  The ideal woman was one who was associated with the 
domestic sphere and her primary function was to bear children.  Physical prowess was seen 
solely as a masculine virtue, while femininity was perceived to be more along the lines of 
what Simone de Beauvoir called a ‘‘prolonged infancy’ — man acted, while she remained in 
the home without economic or political rights’ (1984: 142).  Marriage and procreation were 
seen as the ‘perfect lady’s’ sole function’ (Vicinus, 1972: x), and any ‘male’ characteristics — 
those associated with action — were seen as unfitting for women.  As John Ruskin, a 
leading art critic of the time, asserted, a woman’s ‘power is not for rule, not for battle, and her 
intellect is not for invention or creation, but for sweet ordering’ (2008: 66).  A figure like 
Grendel’s mother, both independent and proactive, was no doubt viewed as extremely 
transgressive, and her involvement in the political world seen as an intrusion into the role of 
men, especially when she is compared to other female figures in the poem such as 
Wealhtheow.  It can be safely assumed that Grendel’s mother, described by Victorian 
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 Grendel is referred to as Godes andsaca, ‘God’s adversary’, a feond on helle, ‘an enemy from hell’ who is fag 
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 My own translations 
translators as ‘monstrous woman’ and ‘savage abyss-keeper of the wave’24 was not 
considered an embodiment of the ideal woman, a figure who may be epitomised in Coventry 
Patmore’s 1852 poem, ‘The Angel in the House’. 
It wasn’t until the nineteenth-century that angels were to become so equated with women as 
they are in the present day.  Before this, angels were represented most often as male 
soldiers, such as those who appear in the Old English Junius 11 MS, as androgynous 
figures, or as cherubim in the form of infants.  The popularisation of the ‘woman as angel’ 
motif may have its roots in Patmore’s ‘The Angel in the House’, in which Patmore describes 
an ideal wife, a devotee to her husband, a passive, pious and pure figure – ‘Man must be 
pleased; but him to please/Is woman's pleasure . . . Dearly devoted to his arms/She loves 
with love that cannot tire’ (1863: 110).  As Nina Auerbach argues in Woman and the Demon, 
the title of the poem became a ‘convenient shorthand for the selfless paragon all women 
were exhorted to be, enveloped in family life and seeking no identity beyond the roles of 
daughter, wife, and mother’ (1982: 69).  The words ‘angel’ and ‘house’ became almost 
synonymous, and consequently left those women who deviated however marginally from this 
domestic and submissive ideal being placed on the opposite side of the binary, and being 
characterised as demons and monsters in male writings.  
In their feminist analysis of Victorian literature, The Madwoman in the Attic (2000), Sandra 
M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar also explore this idea of ‘woman as monster’.  Through an 
analysis of Victorian novels written by male authors, they find women categorised in two 
extremes; the ‘angel in the house’, whom Virginia Woolf, in her 1942 ‘Professions for 
Women’, declared must be killed off in order for woman to be freed from the aesthetic ideal 
which itself has killed her, and its opposite and double, the monster (Woolf, 2001: 244).  The 
‘angels in the house’, to use Patmore’s term, are women who are ‘dearly devoted to [man’s] 
arms’, whereas those who are characterised in demonic terms are those who show 
‘characteristics of a male life of ‘significant action’’ (Gilbert & Gubar, 2000: 28).  William 
Blake, for instance, especially in his later work, extends his often used binary model of 
bipolar extremes to ‘his characterization of the [the female], breaking it roughly along a split 
between passive and active females’ (Essick, 1991: 615).  His passive females are 
presented as virtuous, whereas those who can be considered active are portrayed as evil, a 
‘threat to the (masculine) imagination and its progress through art toward apocalyptic 
transformation’ (Essick, 1991: 615).  Similarly, William Thackeray describes his character, 
the autonomous Becky Sharp of Vanity Fair, as ‘diabolically hideous and slimy”, and having 
a “monster’s hideous tail’ (2001: 607), the binary opposite of the passive and naïve heroine 
Amelia Sedley.  Again, Charles Dickens is noted by Françoise Basch, as including either 
‘highly venerated’ or ‘fiercely caricatured’ women in his literature, their main functions being 
to incarnate either good or evil, with little room for that which may come in between (1974: 
53).  Talking about Bleak House’s character Mrs. Jellyby, Basch argues that ‘the point was 
to convince the reader that any woman with a political mission is a monster, an unnatural 
being’ (1974: 55).25   
Grendel’s mother, both active in her military role as can be seen in her battle with Beowulf, 
and active in a political means as a wrecend, ‘avenger’, joins these other less than ideal 
women in their monstrous and unnatural statuses.  Although she does not elaborate on the 
point, Chrstine Alfano argues that it was likely that the ‘first Old English scholars were 
probably at least partially responsible for incorporating feminine monster imagery into the 
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 Wif unhyre as translated by Arnold (1876: l. 2120), and gryrelic grundhyrde, ‘terrible guardian of the earth/ 
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spouse, and her children, the implication is that her complete attentions should be on the domestic sphere.  
Beowulf text’ (1992: 12) – in other words, Beowulf translators of the nineteenth-century 
created a monster in contrast to the angelic figures of the more submissive and ideal 
women, Wealhtheow and Hildeburh.26  This is evident in the descriptions of her character as 
a ‘fiendish mother-hag’ by Wackerbarth in 1849 (I.2127), and in Arnold’s 1876 description of 
her as a ‘monstrous wit’ (I.1259).  It is possible that Grendel’s mother, deviating so far from 
the ideal image of the ‘Angel in the House’, was presumed to be, or cultivated to represent, a 
demonic or monstrous figure. 
The views that led to the creation of this angel-demon binary may have their beginnings in 
the staunch Christian ideals of the nineteenth-century, and the Bible’s often misogynistic 
depiction of women.  As the late-Victorian social observer T. H. S. Escott stated, ‘the 
Victorian age is in fact above all others an age of religious revival’ (1897: 399), and 
according to Kitson Clark, ‘it might not be too extravagant to say of the nineteenth century 
that probably in no other century, except the seventeenth and perhaps the twelfth, did the 
claims of religion occupy so large a part in the nation's life, or did men speaking in the name 
of religion contrive to exercise so much power’ (1962: 20).  In an Age where the theory of 
evolution was only emerging,27 the threats to a literal reading of the Bible, and especially 
sections such as Genesis and the creation of Adam and Eve, were limited, and the subjects 
of Religion and Science were yet to lose, what was called by Adam Sedgwick, their ‘beautiful 
accordance’ (cited in Garland, 1980: 92).  
The ‘Angel-Demon’ dichotomy of the Victorian Era may be seen as an evolution or another 
manifestation of the ‘Madonna-Eve’ dichotomy that was prevalent in the Middle Ages and 
early Renaissance era.  This dichotomy is apparent in Spenser’s The Faerie Queene (1590 - 
1596) in numerous contrasting figures, in particular the half woman, half serpent figure of 
Errour, and both Gloriana and Una who are representative of Elizabeth I, ‘the Virgin Queen’.  
The Bible glorifies those women who remain passive and obedient to God’s will, namely the 
Virgin Mary, whom many of the women in Victorian literature appear to emulate, such as 
Thackeray’s dependent and meek, Amelia Sedley.  On the other hand, Eve, who eats the 
fruit in order that she and Adam may ‘be as Gods’ (Gen 3:5, Douay-Rheims Bible), is seen 
as an autonomous figure who threatens the patriarchal authority of God, much in the same 
way that Thackeray’s seductive and independent figure, Becky Sharp, is seen as a threat to 
the patriarchal society of the Victorians.   
As with these Victorian novels, the translations of Beowulf also appear to have their 
characters who emulate the Virgin Mary and those who emulate Eve, even if just through a 
Christian reading of the poem.  Wealhtheow, especially, may be seen as the ideal ‘Angel in 
the House’, a symbol of Mary; she appears as a passive figure and a foil to her husband: 
Eode Wealhþeow forð, cwen Hroðgares, cynna gemyndig, ‘Wealhtheow went forth, 
Hrothgar’s queen, mindful of courtesy’ (Tolkien, 2014: II.458-9). Grendel’s mother, on the 
other hand, has been viewed as symbolic of Eve, an agitator who does not succumb to the 
Christian ideal of the passive woman, a view expressed in Jane Chance’s Woman as Hero 
in Old English Literature (2005).  This polaric view of women in translations of Beowulf and 
in Victorian literature is arguably a result of the religious revival in the Victorian age and 
consequently the Victorians being a ‘people of one book’ (Larsen, 2011: 4), the dichotomous 
imagery of the woman as angel or demon hailing from the contrasting figures of the Virgin 
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 Robert Chambers’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation published in 1844 was met with extreme 
controversy over its contradiction to natural theology.  Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, published in 
1859, was also initially met with hostility. 
Mary and Eve.  A change to the more secular dichotomy of the angel and demon may have 
occurred as a result of the conversion to Protestantism in England and the reconsideration of 
Mary’s place within the church and within worship. 
The physical attributes given to Grendel’s mother, making her so extensively beast-like, such 
as her ‘loathsome claws’ (Wackerbarth, 1849: I.1505) and her ‘hideous’ appearance 
(Kemble, 1837: I.1505), along with the description of her as a ‘dam’ (Lumsden, 1881: 
I.1538), may be as a result of the influence of the ancient discipline of physiognomy on 
Victorian literature.  Physiognomy, which underwent a re-popularisation in the nineteenth-
century, involved the assessment of an individual’s character based on their outward 
appearance; John Caspar Lavater, in the early 1800’s, wrote that man’s ‘psychological, 
intellectual and moral life . . . manifests and exerts itself visibly to the most careless 
observer’ (1800: 8-9).28  The influence of physiognomy can be seen in Victorian art and 
literature,29 such as in works by Dickens and Charlotte Brontë,30 and perhaps most famously 
in Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890).  Although today physiognomy is 
regarded as pseudo-science and of no credibility, it is still used in art, literature, and modern 
media, most notably in films aimed at children, for instance The Lion King and other Disney 
films.  Women who did not fit the ideal of the ‘Angel in the House’ were often ascribed 
physically unattractive features as an outward manifestation of their inner characters, for 
example in the many anti-suffragette caricatures of the later years of the Victorian era.  
Physically revolting features are quite likely to have been attached to Grendel’s mother’s 
character in the same way novelists and artists of the time used physiognomy as evidence of 
characters’ negative social traits, and ‘the interest and popularity of physiognomy among the 
reading public ensured that authors could rely on their readers to decode the meaning’ of 
characters’ features’ (Perrett, 2012: 177).  It is difficult to discern whether the terms used in 
translations of Beowulf to describe Grendel’s mother were used consciously, as a means of 
making sure she was seen as a character who was physically, and therefore morally 
repelling, or whether her character was assumed to be physically monstrous as a result of 
the influence of physiognomy at the time.  
Since the Victorian era, which was clearly influenced by the angel-demon dichotomy popular 
at the time, along with the great interest in physiognomy amongst artists and writers, modern 
day translations and adaptations still choose to demonise Grendel’s mother, despite the fact 
that she is never explicitly judged by either the poet or the other characters in the poem for 
her act of revenge.  Rather, Beowulf himself notes that it is selre bið æghwæm þæt he his 
freond wrece, þonne he fela murne, ‘it is always better to avenge one’s friend than to mourn 
overmuch’ (Liuzza, 2000: II.1384-5).  As noted earlier, both Beowulf and Hrothgar recognise 
her actions as part of a legitimate feud.  M.W. Hennequin argues that ‘in neither dialogue nor 
narration does the text specifically condemn or even criticise her actions.  Instead of a 
monster, the poem constructs her as a noblewoman and a brave opponent’ (2008: 513).  
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 A wealth of illustrations pertaining to physiognomy, including the relationships between famous men’s features 
and their characteristics, and human features compared to those of animals exist, most notably those of French 
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 In Jane Eyre, the influence of physiognomy is evident in numerous character descriptions. For example when 
describing Mr. Mason, Jane states, ‘He repelled me exceedingly: there was no power in that smooth-skinned face 
of full oval shape: no firmness in that aquiline nose and small cherry mouth; there was no thought on the low, 
even forehead; no command in that blank, brown eye’ (Brontë, 1864: 200).  
In light of this, an alternative image of her character may be constructed through a re-
evaluation of the translated terms, and also through comparison with other female figures 
from both Anglo-Saxon literature and related literatures, such as Old Norse.  Carol J. Clover 
argues that in an Old Norse context, women as active role-players in society were not all so 
extraordinary; the Old Norse manuscript of legal texts known as Grágâs states that a woman 
was expected to act in the absence of a male relative sem sonr, ‘like a son’ (1993: 369), 
much as Grendel’s mother does in Beowulf. Clover lists numerous Old Norse works that 
feature women who ‘[play] life like a man’, and although such women are ‘occasionally 
deplored by the medieval author’ (1993: 371), they are more commonly admired.31  Saxo 
Grammaticus in his retrospective thirteenth-century History of the Danes makes reference to 
the belief that:  
There were once women in Denmark who dressed themselves to look like men and 
spent almost every minute cultivating soldier’s skills . . . loathing the dainty style of 
living, they would harden body and mind with toil and endurance, rejecting the fickle 
pliancy of girls. . . they courted military celebrity so earnestly that you would have 
guessed they had unsexed themselves . . . [they] sought the clash of arms rather 
than the arm’s embrace, fitted to weapons, hands which should have been weaving, 
desired not the couch but the kill, and those they could have appeased with looks 
they attacked with lances (1998: 212). 
Among these women are described Stikla, who ‘stole away from her fatherland, preferring 
the sphere of war to that of marriage’ (Grammaticus, 1998: 150), and Lagertha, ‘a skilled 
female fighter, who bore a man’s temper in a girl’s body; with locks flowing loose over her 
shoulders she would do battle in the forefront of the most valiant warriors’ (Grammaticus, 
1998: 280).  Although Saxo Grammaticus does not distinguish historical personages or 
women from legend in his history, and although it is clear that they are deviating from the 
norm, it is notable that none of these women are demonised despite their transgression of 
typical gender roles.  
Although considerably fewer examples of powerful women appear in the extant Old English 
corpus, there are still some significant examples, most notably the figure of Æthelflæd, ‘Lady 
of the Mercians’ and daughter of Alfred the Great.  Ruling the Kingdom of Mercia for seven 
years after the death of her husband Æthelred, her and her brother, Edward the Elder (who 
succeeded Alfred the Great), raided Danish-ruled East Anglia and repulsed the last major 
Danish army sent to ravage England.  The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle also tells of her alliances 
with the Scots, the Picts, and Danish settlers against Norwegian invaders, amongst other 
achievements, before her death in 918 (Giles, 1914: 67-9).  She is later described by the 
twelfth-century historian, William of Malmesbury, as ‘Ethelfleda, sister of the king and relict of 
Ethelred, [who] ought not to be forgotten as she was a powerful accession to his party, the 
delight of his subjects, the dread of his enemies, a woman of an enlarged soul’ (Giles, 1847: 
123).  Unfortunately, despite Æthelflæd’s triumphs, F.T. Wainwright asserts that her 
reputation has suffered from bad publicity, and she has faded out of history (1990: 44). 
Another Englishwoman, although unnamed, is described by Procopius, an official of 
Emperor Justinian, and a prominent scholar and historian of the sixth-century, in The History 
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 Clover, in both ‘Regardless of Sex: Men, Women and Power in Early Northern Europe’ (1993), and in ‘Maidens 
and Other Sons’ (1986), lists numerous women, for instance Þornbjörg of Hrólfs saga Gautrekssonar, who 
spends her childhood pursuing martial arts because, as she argues, she is the only heir to King Eirekr of 
Sweden, after which her father provides her with land and men and she adopts the male name Þórbergr.  Auðr of 
the Laxdæla saga, is also mentioned - a woman who assumes male dress and takes revenge on her husband for 
divorcing her, when her brothers refuse to do so. Alexandra Hennessey Olsen, in ‘Women in Beowulf’ (1984) also 
describes numerous female figures who take on typically male roles. 
of the Wars.  After her betrothed married another, she ‘took up the duties of a man and 
proceeded to deeds of war’, bringing with her ‘four hundred ships . . . with no fewer than a 
hundred thousand fighting men’, with her acting as war-leader of this prodigious army 
(Procopius, 2001: 258).32  After her men hunted down her betrothed, Radigis, he pledged to 
marry her, leaving the unnamed Englishwoman as the Queen of Varni.  Despite her ‘[taking] 
up the duties of a man’, she is never reviled by Procopius, or made appear unnatural 
(Procopius, 2001:258).  The figure of this unnamed woman, along with Æthelflæd, may show 
us that active women were not necessarily reviled as is often assumed.  These Anglo-Saxon 
women, along with the women of the Norse sagas and Saxo Grammaticus’s History are 
evidence that other roles existed (in literature at the very least) besides the ideal of the 
cupbearer, or similar more passive roles, and those women who participated in such active 
roles were not necessarily considered monstrous by the Anglo-Saxons or their Norse 
contemporaries.  Grendel’s mother may be compared to many of these female figures of 
both Norse and English origin; not only does she take up the role of vengeance sem sonr, 
‘like a son’, but the Beowulf poet never condemns her for her actions. 
Conclusion 
It would appear, through the exploration of Victorian literature and the societal views of the 
Victorians, that it is quite possible that the current and overriding view of Grendel’s mother 
as a monster has been handed down to us from the early years of Beowulf’s translation.  
This view, developed in the nineteenth-century has been shaped in significant ways by the 
extremely Christian and rather misogynistic culture of the period.  As Berit Åström notes: 
in historical study it is important to remember that the past is not a given, but 
something we create through the choices we make. We choose what sources to use 
and we choose what interpretations to give them. These choices are guided by our 
experiences and expectations . . .  Prejudices and preconceived notions have 
influenced the way Grendel’s mother is regarded (1998: 25-9) 
Grendel’s mother deviated so far from the Victorian’s cultural ideal of the ‘Angel in the 
House’ that she was presumed to be, or perhaps cultivated to be, a demon, and the imagery 
used in these translations has permeated down to the present day.  As Helen Damico and 
Alexandra Hennessey Olsen note, the modern idea that the Middle Ages held contemptible 
views of women, and the characterisation that has resulted from this preconceived notion 
‘does not reflect the actual representation of women in Old English literature’ (1990: 12). 
Although Grendel’s mother was not the Victorian ideal, and most likely not the Anglo-Saxon 
ideal either, the fact that she is an active female figure, often seen in stark contrast to the 
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Monstrous Metamorphosis: Mothers’ Bodies and the Science 




An enduring battle for women’s reproductive rights and bodily autonomy has been waged for 
centuries in the West, which is currently demonstrated by recent government cuts to 
Planned Parenthood in the US, proposals for new abortion legislation in Spain, and the 
continued deferral of an abortion referendum in Ireland (not to mention the sustained lack of 
government support for survivors of symphysiotomy, Magdalene Laundries, and Mother and 
Baby Homes).  This battle has its roots in a primordial masculine fear of the feminine 
capacity to reproduce, which has been extensively documented by feminist writers such as 
Julia Kristeva in Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1982) and Rosi Braidotti in 
Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory 
(1994).  Kristeva builds her theory of abjection on two existing sociological and 
psychoanalytic concerns – that of a primal ontological separation from the animal, and an 
equally primal psychological separation from the mother, where she  argues that “[t]he abject 
confronts us . . . within our personal archaeology, with our earliest attempts to release the 
hold of maternal entity even before ex-isting outside of her” (1982: 13).  The maternal is, for 
Kristeva, a jettisoned fragment of the psyche that is forever held in abeyance and abjection, 
something that cannot be consolidated with the speaking subject, but which also cannot be 
done without (1982: 32-55); the maternal is thus a spectre that haunts subjectivity in 
Kristevan psychoanalysis.  Both Kristeva and Braidotti point out the various means of 
regulation put in place to curb the reproductive abilities of women: for Braidotti, one of the 
most persistent methods of maintaining control is a sustained discursive project that blames 
mothers for bringing monsters into the world, one which simultaneously casts mothers as 
monstrous beings for the very crime of having female bodies (1994: 75-94).  Kristeva’s 
argument, meanwhile, is that the feminine and the maternal body are monstrous because 
they have always already been jettisoned from the Symbolic order and are thus unnameable 
signifiers (1982: 34-35).  This essay argues that these discursive acts, archived in and 
perpetuated by writing, are performative, in that they not only constitute women as monsters 
with the potential to produce further monstrosity, but that such acts have contributed to the 
constitution of the medical sciences, which have fundamentally been formed on the basis on 
a fictional feminine monstrosity.  In other words, the science of birth – obstetrics, 
gynaecology, and (most especially) teratology – is born from fiction. 
 
What is more, because these discursive acts have historically been disseminated through 
writing, they have also had the simultaneous effect of constituting their authors’ identities, 
performing a rebirth of the self that, unlike biological birth, does not hinge upon mysterious 
feminine power or her abject bodily functions.  The mind has thus become the site for a 
masculine reproductive ability that opposes the corporeality of feminine birth.  This ability 
has been made evident most obviously in male writing (especially autobiography), but this is 
in fact only part of a much larger project born of the masculine desire to elide the 
reproductive capabilities of the female body, a project which Braidotti notes has its origins in 
the proto-scientific practices of alchemy (1994: 87).  Where writing, particularly 
autobiography, enacts the (re)birth of the self, it cannot produce a material body; alchemy, 
however, promises to do just that.  Writing that alchemy is ‘a reductio ad absurdum of the 
male fantasy of self-reproduction’ (Braidotti, 1994: 87), Braidotti demonstrates that this is a 
point not at all missed by Mary Shelley, the author of what is probably the most famous 
example of male self-birth, Frankenstein (1818).   The novel is often read as a dire warning 
against attempting procreation without the female body (Homans, 1986; Mellor, 1988; Gilbert 
and Gubar, 1986; Johnson, 1996; and Moers, 1996), yet it was first published during a time 
when the metaphorical association between birth and writing was probably at its height.33  
Susan Stanford Friedman notes that this metaphor combines male/female and mind/body 
binaries with a division of labour, that is ‘into men’s production and women’s reproduction’ 
(1987: 52), where the masculine ‘mind became the symbolic womb of the universe’ (1987: 
53).  However, the mind/body binary initiated and sustained by opposing masculine writing 
with feminine birth is complicated in Frankenstein by the fact that the novel was written by a 
woman, during a time in which writing was still largely deemed the province of men. 
 
In this article I examine how the discourse used to perpetuate the concept of writing and 
birth as binary opposites is made up of narratives stemming from various authorities and 
disciplines, including literature.  The evolution of these narratives over the centuries has 
been fuelled by the progression of human knowledge, especially the advancement of the 
medical sciences, yet women’s bodily conduct is under no less scrutiny today than it was a 
thousand years ago, precisely because of continued fears of female reproductive autonomy.  
While scientific advances have certainly assisted women’s sexual emancipation through the 
development of contraceptives and the administration of both pregnancy care and abortion, 
birth sciences such as gynaecology and obstetrics owe their naissance to narratives of 
fictional feminine monstrosity that at all times requires regulation.  Along with the regulation 
of women’s bodies, the sustained attempts to make babies outside the female body, and the 
continued dominance of masculine self-birth through writing, I show that as our 
understanding of the science of birth has metamorphosed, our reasons behind finding the 
origins of ourselves have not.  I thus note the historical progression of fictional narratives 
concerning the birth of ‘monsters’, from antiquity, to early modernity, and through to current 
obstetrical and teratological concerns, then turning my attention to how these narratives 
have not only constituted women as potentially monstrous without proper regulation, but that 
these have in turn constituted men as far more capable of reproduction, in that their 
reproductive power (writing) is represented as free from abjection and monstrosity, as well 
as fundamentally unsuitable for women to pursue.  Finally, using Shelley’s Frankenstein, I 
explain that birthing the self through writing is no less fraught with the potential for 
monstrosity. 
 
My understanding of ‘monstrosity’ stems from its etymology (see below), which categorises 
monsters as bodies that are fundamentally uncategorisable, that is, beyond the realm of the 
knowable.  The signifier, ‘monster’ is what Jeffrey Jerome Cohen names a ‘third-term 
supplement’ (1996: 6-7), precisely because the term designates a body that lacks a signified. 
Kristeva connects the unnameable to the feminine, which thereby demonstrates its 
connection to monstrosity: ‘[w]hat we designate as ‘feminine,’ far from being a primeval 
essence, will be seen as an ‘other’, without a name, which subjective experience confronts 
when it does not stop at the appearance of its identity’ (1982: 58-59).  Where Kristeva’s 
analysis centres on the Symbolic, Braidotti’s work in Nomadic Subjects links the Symbolic to 
the bodily by stating that because of the feminine ability to reproduce, woman is 
‘morphologically dubious’ (1994: 80).  My reading of Frankenstein complicates this view of 
the maternal because the maternal body is circumvented in the novel, where reproduction 
takes place through a masculine creative force inaugurated by an intellectual desire to know 
and thus have dominion over ‘the tremendous secrets of the human frame’ (Shelley, 1996: 
32).  Frankenstein thus subverts the monstrosity of feminine birth by instead proposing the 
monstrosity of masculine creativity, a subversion that is enabled by the novel’s events, which 
demonstrate the lack of control we have over our creations, whatever those may be.  
However, this lack of control is coloured by a deep ambivalence regarding our 
responsibilities towards our creations, which, in a patriarchal society governed by a binary 
view of the world, ultimately affects women more than it does men. 
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 Gilbert and Gubar’s (1986) extensive study in The Madwoman in the Attic demonstrates just how pervasive 
this metaphor was in the nineteenth century.  
The Metamorphosis of Monstrosity: From Fiction to Science 
 
The birth of children that were once considered monstrous, that is, children with disabilities 
or birth defects, miraculous births, and even twins or other multiple births, still feature in 
popular culture as sources of uncanny power and monstrosity.34  Where antiquity gave us 
the miraculous births of gods and monsters, including Leda laying an egg after being raped 
by Zeus in the form of a swan, the birth of the Minotaur after Pasiphae mated with a bull, and 
the creation of the giants from the blood of Uranus on his castration by his son Cronus, 
Medieval texts give similar explanations for monstrous births, describing them as a result of 
external phenomena visited upon humanity by a castigatory God (Wilson, 1993: 10).  Dudley 
Wilson asserts that it was not until the seventeenth-century that explanations for the 
existence of monsters were internalised and connected to human acts, but his claim is 
based on his distinction between ‘fanciful’ monsters, those of a literary persuasion, and the 
birth of disabled children (Wilson, 1993: 10).  I am purposefully blurring this line in this paper 
because the arrival (or birth) of monsters (real or fanciful) has, throughout history, resulted in 
the regulation of human behaviour by warning us of the consequences of aberrant conduct.  
Imaginary or not, monsters all have the same function, which is to act as literal signifiers.  
Most scholars of monstrosity will point out that the etymology of “monster” is the Latin 
monstrare, meaning ‘to teach’ or ‘to demonstrate’; Chris Baldick adds to this the verb’s 
second conjugation, monere, which means ‘to warn’ (Baldick, 1995: 48).  In either case, the 
arrival of a monster always already indicates the arrival of something else, usually the arrival 
of further misfortune. 
 
Between the early sixteenth- and late eighteenth-centuries, these signifiers acted as 
warnings to the communities in which these children were born.  Wilson uses a sixteenth-
century ballad, The forme and shape of a Monstrous child, born at Maydstone in Kent 
(1568), as an example of such a cautionary tale, which in this instance is a warning to the 
population of England to cease their sinful ways.  Using the physical description of the child, 
the balladeer matches each of the child’s deformities to a transgressive act by the adult 
population of England, where the child’s existence is read as a bodily signifier of God’s 
wrath.  Alexandra Walsham writes that ‘[t]hese unsightly spectacles unveiled His glory no 
less clearly than perfect human specimens’ (Walsham, 1999: 194-5), as they not only 
demonstrated God’s omnipotence but his ability to create ‘physical malformity’, which, as 
Walsham notes ‘was the outward manifestation of private immorality’ (1999: 201).  Thus, in 
the Maidstone child’s case, his mouth was ‘flitted to the right fide’ (Lilly, 1870: 195), because 
the people of England’s ‘mouthes they infect/ With lying othes and flaightes,/ Blafpheming 
God, and prince reiect,/ As they were brutifh beaftes./ Their filthy talke and poyfoned fpeech/ 
Disfigures fo the mouth,/ That fom wold think ther ftood the breech/ Such filth it breatheth 
forth’ (Lilly, 1870: 196).  Similarly, the child’s shortened arm is blamed for the community’s 
idleness and his left leg growing upwards towards his head is regarded as a warning against 
refusing to be led by one’s ‘natural’ leaders (Lilly, 1870: 196).  However, while Wilson insists 
that the balladeer’s ‘call to penitence is directed towards England and its people in general’, 
only giving a cursory nod to the prose introduction’s ‘more precise accusation’ against the 
child’s mother (Wilson, 1993: 47), closer consideration of one of the child’s afflictions 
coupled with the prose introduction’s accusations results in a reading that clearly shows who 
is blamed for the child’s malformation. 
 
First, the child’s mother, named as Marget Mere, is described in the ballad’s introduction as 
‘being vnmaryed’ and having ‘played the naughty packe’ (Lilly, 1870: 194).  Second, the last 
of the child’s afflictions is described as a ‘broade lump of flefh, in fafhion lyke a rofe, in the 
myddeft whereof was a hole’ situated in the middle of his back, which the balladeer explains 
‘fhew us playne/ Our clofe and hidden vice/ Which doth behind vs run amayne/ In vyle and 
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fhameful wyfe’ (Lilly, 1870: 197).  The alluded physical similarity between this growth on the 
child’s back and female genitalia is, like the balladeer’s aforementioned associations, a 
corporeal manifestation of the child’s sinful origin.35 
   
Another textual example Wilson examines to build his thesis of an Early Modern 
understanding of monstrosity is Ambroise Paré’s Des monstres et prodiges (1573), which 
gives the following explanations for the cause of monstrous births: 
 
  The first is the glory of God.  The second his anger.  The third too great a 
  quantity of semen.  The fourth too small a quantity.  The fifth is the imagination.  
  The sixth the tightness or smallness of the womb.  The seventh the indecorous 
  position of the mother, as when, being pregnant, she sits too long with her 
  thighs crossed or squeezed against her belly.  The eighth, because of a fall or 
  blows directed against the belly of the pregnant mother.  The ninth, because of 
  hereditary or accidental illness. The tenth, because of the decay or corruption of 
  seminal fluid.  The eleventh, because of the mixing or mingling of the semen. 
  The twelfth, because of trickeries of malignant tavern rogues.  The thirteenth, 
  because of Demons or Devils (Wilson, 1993: 68). 
 
Of the thirteen causes of monstrosity Paré lists, six can be attributed to mothers or mothers’ 
bodies, while only four can be attributed to fathers, three to supernatural intervention, and 
one to fraudulence.  What is more, five of the six causes attributed to mothers are the result 
of unchecked behaviour, such as being careless while in the state of pregnancy (including 
the self-regulation of the ‘imagination’, which I will explain shortly), and sexual 
transgressions such as adultery, the effect of which was considered to be the mixing of 
sperm and the resultant monstrous births.  Wilson (1993: 97) notes that even the birth of 
twins was regarded the result of two impregnations, something scholars such as Paré may 
have picked up from studying the works of the ancient Greeks.  The twins, Pollux and 
Castor, for example, were the issue of Leda, Zeus, and Leda’s husband, Tyndareus: where 
Castor had a normal human birth, Pollux, being the son of Zeus (who had taken the form of 
a swan in order to rape Leda) hatched from an egg.  What is clear is that by the time Paré 
was writing late in the sixteenth century, more emphasis was being put on curbing the 
behaviour of women than of men, especially with regard to sexual behaviour.  Yet, what is 
also made clear, simply by the vast number of both popular and scholarly publications 
concerning monstrous birth in this period, is that monstrosity intrigued and fascinated the 
people of Europe.  By the eighteenth-century, monstrous births not only drew a curious 
crowd but were lucrative business opportunities for relatives of the afflicted.  Dennis Todd 
(1995: 5) points out that the types of monster exhibitions and freak shows made famous by 
the Victorians were in fact already popular by the early eighteenth-century, meaning that 
falsified reports of monstrous births were not uncommon amongst those looking to make a 
quick buck. 
 
Such an occasion was the birth of seventeen rabbits by one Mary Toft of Godalming, Surrey 
in 1726.  Toft was able to convince a local surgeon, John Howard, as well as surgeon to 
King George I, Nathaniel St. André, that she had birthed sundry parts of a total of seventeen 
rabbits, as well as portions of an eel and a cat, the motivation for which was the money she 
could attract as a curiosity to the public.  Todd explains that Toft’s ability to fool so many 
people was down to ‘the entire mise-en-scène of pregnancy, labor, and birth that [she] 
staged’ (1995: 8), part of which was made possible by the fact that she had only very 
recently miscarried.  Todd writes that ‘[h]er miscarriage had left her with signs of pregnancy.  
Often she bled, and often her pain was unpretended.  What was not real, she could act, and 
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her most impressive performances were enhanced by her ability to set off powerful, 
pulsating contractions in her abdomen, contractions lasting for hours at a time’ (1995: 8).   
 
However, our understanding of unusual births has metamorphosed in the centuries since 
Toft’s miraculous issue, not just with regard to scientific explanation but also according to the 
narratives of contemporary knowledge of birth and pregnancy.  As utterly convincing as her 
bodily acts were, what first persuaded the local surgeon, Howard, of Toft’s veracity was the 
story she invented to explain the births’ origins, claiming that while five weeks’ pregnant and 
weeding a field, she ‘was startled by a rabbit.  She and the woman she was working with ran 
after it but could not catch it.  The chase made her long for rabbits’ (Todd, 1995: 7).  While 
her narrative sounds far less substantial to a modern audience than her physical symptoms 
of birth, it rested on a seventeenth century belief in maternal imprinting – the belief that a 
pregnant woman’s thoughts, wishes, and desires somehow transfer to the child in utero (the 
fifth reason Paré cites as a cause of monstrous birth).  Rebecca Kukla explains that the 
concept of maternal imprinting is based on an ancient view of the womb as permeable and 
therefore susceptible to corruption (2005: 5), noting the concerns for what ‘the pregnant 
body craves – that it is not merely passively prone to penetration, but that it in fact is the seat 
of capricious and forceful appetites that beckon foreign substances in’ (2005: 6).  She adds 
that ‘[t]he whole notion of a craving – so deeply linked in our imagination with pregnancy – is 
of not just any appetite but an appetite that is inherently irrational, unpredictable, forceful, 
and hard to control or deny’ (Kukla, 2005: 6).  It was therefore not Toft’s physical symptoms 
but the narrative she concocted that convinced others of her authenticity. 
 
Kukla states that imprinting was the explanation for monstrosities from the sixteenth-century 
to the early eighteenth-century (2005: 13); it is, however, a belief that persisted long into the 
nineteenth-century, and not only by the uneducated masses.  What is more, while we no 
longer believe that a child will bear physical pointers of its mother’s thoughts and cravings, 
‘the theory of the maternal imagination forgoes a crucial link between medical obstetrics and 
the management of maternal character and ethics’ (Kukla, 2005: 17) that still exist today, 
which includes the careful regulation of what women imbibe during pregnancy.  Aside from 
Mary Toft, one of the most famous historical examples of perceived maternal imprinting was 
the nineteenth-century ‘Elephant Man’, Joseph Merrick, whose birth appeared apparently 
normal, but who began to display bodily abnormalities at the age of two.  Citing a 
contemporary description of Merrick in the nineteenth century, Philip K. Wilson writes that 
‘[a]mong the most prominent of the ‘bizarre distortions’ upon his body was an ‘extraordinary 
mass of flesh’ that ‘continued to force its way from beneath the upper lip,’ eventually 
protruding ‘several inches’ from Joseph’s mouth in the form of a ‘grotesque snout’ that 
weighed several ounces’ (Wilson, 2002: 13).  While the diagnosis of Merrick’s condition 
remains disputed, the explanation at the time was that he suffered from maternal imprinting, 
a result of his mother being startled by a ‘parading’ elephant at a Humberstonegate fair while 
in her second trimester (Wilson, 2002: 14).  As Kukla states, a dominant belief of the time 
was that although, ‘no one could see into the womb, the resulting child could be ‘read’ as a 
kind of biography of the mother’s activities and (especially) private passions and cravings 
during pregnancy’ (Kukla, 2005: 15).  Thus, Merrick’s condition archived his mother’s fear of 
the parading elephant, while Mary Toft’s admission at being startled by a rabbit and 
consequently desiring rabbit meat was understood to be a sound prognosis in the early 
eighteenth century for her seventeen monstrous rabbit births. 
 
Kukla explains that the link between maternal imagination and monstrous birth hinged not 
only on the alleged permeability of the womb but on a seventeenth-century understanding of 
natural philosophy which viewed passions and appetites as inhabiting 
 
..an interesting border territory between the realm of the mental and meaningful and 
the realm of the bodily and brutally causal . . . Passions, despite their meaningful 
content, traded in and operated through somatic urges and responses rather than 
the cold, dispassionate light of reason.  Thus the passions provided the perfect 
medium for meanings to translate themselves from the world onto bodies.  
Women’s pregnant bodies, with their weaker resistance to passions and their 
intense cravings, their higher impressionability, and the fragile or nonexistent 
boundaries separating them from their fetuses, were in turn ‘natural’ sites for such 
passionate transmissions (Kukla, 2005: 17). 
 
It is precisely such a passion that a young Victor Frankenstein falls prey to in Mary Shelley’s 
Gothic classic, which results in the misshapen ‘birth’ of a Creature that, tellingly, has no 
legitimate name.  Braidotti notes that, like the medical sciences use cadavers to study life, 
the study of monsters (that is, anomalous births) has constituted the norm in biology, by 
demonstrating its deviations (1994: 84).  The fascination with ‘monstrous’ births led to the 
study of teratology, which, as Braidotti notes is the study of congenital abnormalities.  
Braidotti explains that teratology is a ‘forerunner of modern embryology’, where ‘abnormal 
cases’ are set up ‘in order to elucidate normal behaviour’, a logic she explains 
psychoanalysis will later follow for mental disorders (Braidotti, 1994: 84).  Braidotti’s thesis, 
which is that the birth sciences stem from a patriarchal desire to reproduce without the need 
for women’s bodies and therefore the possibility of monsters, becomes clear when she 
states that ‘[o]n the imaginary level . . . the test-tube babies of today mark the long-term 
triumph of the alchemists’ dream of dominating nature through their self-inseminating, 
masturbatory practices’ (Braidotti, 1994: 88).  In a sense, then, alchemy coupled with an 
archaic understanding of the mother’s role in forming her foetus, has led to teratology – 
studying the abnormal to better know the normal – which, in turn, has led to embryology and 
the eventual making of babies through IVF and surrogacy for example.  The point Braidotti is 
emphasising above is that circumventing the maternal is now possible on a physical level, 
where, before, it could only take place autobiographically.  
 
Monstrous Misogyny: The Birth of the Birth Sciences 
 
Braidotti notes the ancient view that women were only vessels for the spark of life carried by 
the sperm, vessels, however, that had the potential to deform the developing child: 
 
  [i]t is as if the mother, as a desiring agent, has the power to undo the work of 
  legitimate procreation through the sheer force of her imagination.  By 
  deforming the product of the father, she cancels what psychoanalytic theory 
  calls ‘the Name-of-the-Father’.  The female ‘signature’ of the reproductive pact 
  is unholy, inhuman, illegitimate, and it remains the mere pre-text to horrors to 
  come.  Isn’t the product of women’s creativity always so? (1994: 86). 
 
The birth sciences of today – gynaecology, obstetrics, teratology, embryology – all have their 
basis in the fictional notion that women’s bodies are a natural danger to the children they 
carry, children who have, as Braidotti notes above, been considered as created by the 
sperm alone, where the uterus was thought only to be a receptacle for housing a developing 
child. Gynaecology and obstetrics are sciences formed on the basis that women’s sexual 
health before, during, and after childbirth require medicalized regulation.  Deborah Lupton 
explains that the underlying reason for the medicalization of women’s reproductive health is 
that ‘women have traditionally been defined as the Other in medical discourse, the ‘sick’ or 
incomplete version of men: as weaker, unstable, the source of infection, impure, the carriers 
of venereal disease or the source of psychological damage to their children’ (1994: 132). As 
such, ‘twin paradoxical ideologies’ have grown through medical discourse, where ‘on the one 
hand, women [were seen] as weak and defective, [and] on the other, women [were seen] as 
dangerous and polluting’ (Lupton, 1994: 132). 
 
Gynaecology is a good example of my argument that the birth sciences were predicated on 
fictional constructions of monstrous femininity, because, as Lupton points out, it ‘identifies 
women’s reproductive anatomy as a special field of study, for which there is no masculine 
counterpart’ (1994: 133), where the study has ‘legitimated views that sexual activity and 
reproduction are more fundamental to women’s than men’s nature’ (1994: 133). That 
‘contemporary anatomy textbooks designed for medical students still tend to portray the 
male body as the standard human body, against which the ‘different’ female body is 
compared’ (1994: 132) solidifies the notion that women’s bodies are a sign of otherness that 
rests on reproductive difference. What is more, like surgery and anatomy, the birth sciences 
are concerned with penetrating the body in order to discover its inner workings, where the 
invention of phallic instruments for looking inside the body, such as the speculum, the 
gynaecological ‘wand,’ and even the ultrasound, have become symbols of a penetrative, 
destructive, and patriarchal discourse.  In fact, when I first read about Toft’s case (Todd, 
1995), my predominant thought was of the amount of invasive examination Toft was subject 
to, not just by doctors and surgeons, but by an increasingly curious public who came to 
witness her miraculous births.  In many ways, the birth sciences were premised on a desire 
to witness the miracle of life, if not to recreate it outside the body, then at least to control the 
end result.  Certainly, the current concern for a new generation of ‘designer babies’ is both 
born out of and echoes earlier fears that monsters will be born.   
 
I will shortly make a comparison between Frankenstein’s ‘midnight labours’ (Shelley, 1996: 
32) and the view that birth is abject, but first I turn my attention to the construction of 
feminine birth and masculine writing as binary opposites, in order to later demonstrate how 
Shelley blurs the lines between masculine and feminine, between writing and birth, and 
between pure and abject.   
 
The Hideousness of Feminine Birth and the Purity of the Masculine Imagination 
 
In The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Imagination 
(1979), Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar write that in men’s writing, women are often 
represented as ‘[e]mblems of filthy materiality’ who ‘in their very freakishness . . . possess 
unhealthy energies, [and] powerful and dangerous arts’ (Gilbert and Gubar, 2001: 157).  Like 
Lupton’s view that women were seen as ‘dangerous and polluting’ (1994: 132), Gilbert and 
Gubar employ the language of monstrosity when speaking of the perceived otherness of 
women, where the ‘unhealthy energies’ and ‘dangerous arts’ practiced by women are 
indicative of female creativity as a whole, meaning that female reproduction is relegated to 
the realms of the monstrous and abject.  However, in order for the continued propagation of 
the species, men still rely on women’s bodies, which means that pregnancy, birth, and 
nursing have all been heavily regulated by patriarchal forces, including the dissemination of 
popular texts that threaten unruly women with the issue of monsters.  Where I demonstrated 
the conceptual reasoning behind these practices in a previous section, this section deals 
with the flipside of constituting feminine creativity with monstrosity, which is the constitution 
of the masculine imagination as pure, and its conceptual tools, in this case, writing, as 
unachievable by women. 
 
The binary of male writing and female birth is made possible by the analogical connection 
between writing and male sexuality, which Gilbert and Gubar note when discussing Gerard 
Manley Hopkins’ proclamation that ‘[t]he male quality is the creative gift’ (cited in Gilbert and 
Gubar, 1986: 92).  Using Hopkins’ statement, Gilbert and Gubar explain that ‘[m]ale 
sexuality, in other words, is not just analogically but actually the essence of literary power’ 
(Gilbert and Gubar, 1986: 92), which, they explain, has cast male writers as fathers of their 
creative endeavours.  Furthermore, ‘a notion of ‘ownership’ or possession is embedded in 
the metaphor of paternity’ (Gilbert and Gubar, 1986: 94), meaning that ‘[i]f male sexuality is 
integrally associated with the assertive presence of literary power, female sexuality is 
associated with the absence of such power’ (Gilbert and Gubar, 1986: 95).  They explain 
that Hopkins ‘was articulating a concept central to that Victorian culture of which he was in 
this case a representative male citizen’ (1986: 92), where this concept encapsulates the 
‘patriarchal notion that the writer ‘fathers’ his text just as God fathered the world’ (1986: 92).  
Furthermore, they write, this ‘metaphor is built into the very word author, with which writer, 
deity, and pater familias are identified’ (1986: 92).  Conversely, Elaine Showalter argues that 
‘literary maternity predominated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (1981: 188), 
where she asks, ‘If to write is to metaphorically give birth, from what organ can males 
generate texts?’ (1981: 188). This question is particularly pertinent when one considers the 
number of female-authored texts in the literary canon (which are very few), as well as the 
scorn which female writers have had to endure from their male counterparts, of which 
Hopkins’ is only one example.  
 
There are hundreds of examples of masculine scorn for women’s writing throughout history, 
which feminist literary criticism has painstakingly highlighted in its attempt to explain the 
inherent misogyny of canonicity.  For example, in Emily Brontë in the Hands of Male Critics 
(1971), Carol Ohmann demonstrates the differences between reviews of Emily Brontë’s 
Wuthering Heights (1847) and the same novel when it was first published under Brontë’s 
pseudonym, Ellis Bell, who most (male) reviewers thought to be a man.  Ohmann finds that 
where most reviews of the novel are favourable when thought to have been written by a 
man, when later known to be written by a woman, are often condescending, unfavourable, or 
positive only in the sense that the novel is seen as ‘a work of ‘female genius and female 
authorship’’ (Ohmann, 1971: 908). 
 
Like the author-patriarch that Gilbert and Gubar invoke in The Madwoman in the Attic, 
Frankenstein pictures himself as godlike in his ability to create, telling Walton that ‘[a] new 
species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy and excellent natures would 
owe their being to me.  No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I 
should deserve their’s’ (Shelley, 1996: 32).  Yet, the author of the novel is a woman, and 
what Frankenstein does, despite fulfilling the alchemical ‘male fantasy of self-reproduction’ 
(Braidotti, 1994: 87), is problematize the imagined purity of masculine ‘birth’. Using Early 
Modern examples of monstrous births, I noted earlier that, if improperly regulated, feminine 
birth can result in monstrosity.  As Gilbert and Gubar have, moreover, explained that 
nineteenth century male writers (and, I might add, many male writers of the twentieth 
century) viewed women as unable to write because they do not have the sexual capacity to 
father a text.  Thus, notes Showalter, ‘the woman writer experiences her own gender as a 
‘painful obstacle or even a debilitating inadequacy’’ (Showalter, 1981: 194-195, citing Gilbert 
and Gubar 1979: 50), where, in this case, feminine lack results in monstrous birth.  
 
That masculine writing has been compared to fathering a text through insemination, as well 
as to birthing it demonstrates both the irrationality of patriarchal structures and the 
doggedness with which patriarchy has confined women to the private sphere.  What is more, 
the strict enforcement of boundaries between the private sphere and the public (a sphere 
where publication takes place), especially during the nineteenth century (where both the new 
literary form of the novel and women’s writing in general were beginning to gain a foothold), 
is related in no small way to the masculine tendency to naturalize men’s creative abilities 
and pair these with women’s procreative abilities (Stanford Friedman, 1987: 52).  Whether, 
as Gilbert and Gubar argue, men ‘father’ their texts, or, as Showalter contends, they ‘mother’ 
them, women were understood in the nineteenth century as inappropriate authors for literary 
texts, precisely because they already demonstrate the ability to mother children. This is 
partly why Shelley names Frankenstein her ‘hideous progeny’ in the introduction to the 1831 
version (Poovey, 1996: 251).  However, as the novel’s narrative events reveal, the creative 
acts of birth and writing are both far too complex to act as a binary pair, and either may 
result in the making of a monster. 
 
Making Monsters: Creativity and the Metaphor of Childbirth 
 
If men are said to ‘father’/mother texts, and women ‘mother’ children, Mary Shelley 
confounds the binary, not merely by subversively performing the masculine role of author, 
but through the narrative of Frankenstein, where the titular character attempts to procreate 
without the assistance of a woman’s body by using an old alchemical recipe he has found 
and mixing it with contemporary scientific technologies.  According to both the popular and 
scientific discourses of the centuries leading up to the publication of Frankenstein (especially 
popular ballads and proto-obstetrical papers of the sixteenth-, seventeenth- and eighteenth-
centuries), pregnant women require strict regulation if they are not to give birth to monsters.  
Regulatory behaviour includes being wary of strong passions, desires or frights while in this 
state as these may imprint upon the child.  If we take Frankenstein as mother of his creation, 
it would seem that the logic of maternal imprinting is revealed in the novel’s narrative events: 
before and throughout his ‘labour’, Frankenstein becomes obsessed with possessing the 
knowledge of life, but it is not a knowledge born of reason and is, instead, one born of 
passion.  After having discovered the secret of life and thereupon deciding to make a man, 
Frankenstein describes himself as having ‘grown pale with study’ and ‘emaciated with 
confinement’, because a ‘resistless, and almost frantic impulse, urged [him] forward’ and he 
remembers that he ‘seemed to have lost all soul or sensation but for this one pursuit’ 
(Shelley, 1996: 32).  One could certainly read Frankenstein’s desire to know and to usurp 
women’s life-giving abilities as a craving in the sense of a maternal craving, and his pursuit 
of such knowledge as a passion of the type Rebecca Kukla has described (2005: 17).  What 
is more, Frankenstein’s maternal craving is passed on to the Creature, whose desire to know 
manifests itself in his education by the unknowing De Lacey family, by the books he 
subsequently learns to read, and in his yearning to know the origins of his ‘accursed self’.  It 
is also visibly manifested in the monster’s body, who is not actually born in any bodily sense 
of the term but made from the sutured parts of human and animal corpses Frankenstein has 
illegally procured.   
 
The belief in maternal imprinting was evidently still widely accepted in Shelley’s lifetime, as 
this interpretation of Frankenstein indicates, but also as William St. Clair notes of Shelley’s 
moods while lactating after the birth of her fifth child reveal.  He writes that Shelley’s anxiety 
regarding her father’s welfare while she was in Italy was blamed for the ensuing case of 
diarrhoea that Percy Florence suffered in the summer of 1820, the same illness that had 
killed his sister Clara and his brother William (St. Clair, 1989: 462).  St. Clair explains that 
Shelley’s worry and depression were thought by her husband to be the fault of Godwin’s 
letters, which always imparted an often dire need for money, and, by August of that year, 
Percy wrote to Godwin, ‘[h]is main point [being] . . . Godwin’s effect on Mary’s milk’ (St. Clair, 
1989: 462).  Kukla (2005: 11) writes of breast-feeding that ‘[m]ilk was seen as a direct 
medium of transference of the nature of the nursing body, not only physical but moral, to the 
infant’, meaning that the nursing mother was just as much danger to her child as she was 
when pregnant.  Mothers’ thoughts were so dangerous, they could not only be the cause of 
monstrosity, but could, quite monstrously, kill the very child they were expected to ‘naturally’ 
protect and nourish, during pregnancy and exceeding that, through the child’s nursing and its 
later life.  Shelley knew well the dangers of mothering, losing three of her four children at an 
early age, as well as having lost her mother during her own birth.  Many critics have 
therefore read Frankenstein as a birth narrative, not just in regard to the Creature’s 
monstrous birth outside the womb, but of Shelley as an author.  Gilbert, for instance, 
understands Shelley’s ‘developing sense of herself as a literary creature and/or creator’ as 
‘inseparable from her emerging self-definition as daughter, mistress, wife, and mother’ 
(Gilbert, 1978: 51).  Barbara Johnson, on the other hand, reads the novel as a rejection of 
bodily gestation in favour of a clean and controlled birth (1996: 244), but this would suggest 
that writing is an untroublesome act, the effects of which can be predicted.  However, writing 
is the only method in which men have succeeded in giving birth to an autobiographical self 
without the assistance of mothers or mothers’ bodies; the alchemical homunculus is, like 
much of alchemy’s more popular pursuits, a sad impossibility.   
 
This is also arguably why Frankenstein is a novel that is so lacking in mothers: 
Frankenstein’s own mother dies quite early on in the text; he destroys the female creature 
before she can reproduce little monsters of her own; the Creature murders his fiancée, 
Elizabeth, in the very bed that would make her mother to Frankenstein’s children; and, it is 
an Oedipal mixture of Elizabeth and his mother that he dreams of after bringing the Creature 
to life: 
 
  I thought I saw Elizabeth, in the bloom of health, walking in the streets of 
  Ingolstadt.  Delighted and surprised, I embraced her; but as I imprinted the first 
  kiss on her lips, they became livid with the hue of death; her features appeared 
  to change, and I thought that I held the corpse of my dead mother in my arms 
  (Shelley, 1996: 34) 
 
While Frankenstein clearly demonstrates the folly of male usurpation of birth, it also exposes 
its young author’s anxiety at creating a written narrative in place of birth, which situated her 
as an authority taking up the mantle of a masculine discursive practice.  The rebirth of the 
self through writing is simultaneously a rejection of the physicality of birth and a masculine 
appropriation of women’s procreative abilities, and, it would seem, this is precisely what 
Shelley is painstakingly emphasising through Frankenstein’s narrative of masculine birth and 
conception. 
 
What is more, Gilbert notes that the Creature which Frankenstein gives life to is ‘as 
nameless as a woman is in patriarchal society, as nameless as unmarried, illegitimately 
pregnant Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin may have felt herself to be at the time she wrote 
Frankenstein’ (Gilbert, 1978: 66).  Recalling the very beginning of this essay, namelessness 
is indicative of monstrosity, where the appellation ‘monster’ serves as a filler for an otherwise 
unnameable (and, furthermore, unknowable) entity.  The namelessness of women is 
connected to their exchangeability in a patriarchal system (precisely such a system that 
Mary Shelley finds herself in), where ‘[f]or women . . . propriety is achieved through the 
exchange of names, which means that the name is never permanent, and that the identity 
secured through the name is always dependent on the social exigencies of paternity and 
marriage.  Expropriation is thus the condition of identity for women’ (Butler, 1993: 153).  
Namelessness as Gilbert invokes it is also linked to Shelley’s ‘illegitimacy’ regarding her 
ability to wield the pen, and, moreover, recreate herself as writer.  Writing, especially 
autobiographical writing, is profoundly connected to the lack of mothers in Frankenstein, and 
in Shelley’s own life, where Barbara Johnson asks if writing is ‘somehow always in the 
process of symbolically killing the mother off by telling her the lie that we have given birth to 
ourselves’ (1996: 244). 
 
What is more, Johnson notes that this ‘lie’ where we give birth to ourselves through writing is 
predicated on ‘the story of the difficulty of conforming to the standard of what a man should 
be’ (1996: 251), and that, for a female writer endeavouring to birth herself autobiographically, 
twin problems arise.  These problems are, as Johnson explains, ‘on the one hand, to resist 
the pressure of masculine autobiography as the only literary genre available for [the female 
writer’s] enterprise, and, on the other, to describe a difficulty in conforming to a female ideal 
which is largely a fantasy of the masculine, not the feminine, imagination’ (1996: 521).  The 
result, as we know, is monstrosity, not just because Shelley lays an ‘illegitimate’ claim to 
writing, but because Frankenstein is so often read autobiographically.36  
 
If we read the novel using Kristevan psychoanalysis, then the killing off or omission of 
mothers in the text is a masculinist imperative to free the self from the abjection of the 
mother’s body, which signifies, among other things, the decay and eventual death of 
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materiality (Kristeva 1982: 13-14; 78-79).  It is for this reason that we can read Shelley’s 
appropriation of writing as a specifically masculine endeavour.  However, both her 
femaleness and her motherhood haunt the edges of the novel.  For instance, Anne K. Mellor 
notes that the novel is framed by the narrative Walton sends his sister, Margaret Walton 
Saville, who has the same initials as Shelley (Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley) and that the 
novel’s narrative progress takes place over nine months (1988: 54).  What is more, the 
novel’s central narrative arc is of a birth and the novel’s publication performed the birth of 
Shelley as author (Mellor, 1988: 52), all of which suggest that birth and writing are for 
Shelley, at least on an unconscious level, conceptually inextricable.  Yet, Frankenstein also 
puts forward the idea that a masculine attempt at birth is what results in monstrosity, and 
that perhaps what may be monstrous after all is the symbolic matricide that masculine 




While there are definitive parallels that can be drawn between the carrying and delivery of a 
child and writing, the issue at stake when making this metaphorical connection is the loss of 
the material body.  Rosemary Betterton writes that ‘the traditional metaphor of creativity in 
which the (male) artist claims to conceive and give birth to imaginative ideas’ (2006: 84) is 
paradoxical for female artists because their bodies hold the potential for the literal 
embodiment of this ideal.  Betterton argues that ‘the contradiction that the metaphor of male 
creativity conceals [is] that actual conception and pregnancy are bodily conditions that 
cannot be ‘enabled’ by will or desire and  in this sense, are quite unlike the practices in 
making art’ (2006: 84-5).   
 
This metaphor quite literally comes to life in Frankenstein, writing the mother’s body out of 
the narrative through the artificial birth of the Creature and represented by the lack of 
mothers and women, who symbolise this materiality, in the text.  While mothers are missing 
in the text, women, as representations of materiality and the potential for motherhood, are 
also made absent: Elizabeth is killed by the Creature on her wedding night, Safie, along with 
the De Laceys, runs away from him, effectively abandoning him, and Justine is hanged for 
the Creature’s murder of Frankenstein’s brother, William. 
 
At each point in the text where there is potential for female creativity, either Frankenstein or 
his Creature quash this potential by usurping the role of creator or reinforcing male agency.  
This is, of course, excepting the female creativity responsible for existence of the novel itself.  
It is thus possible to read Frankenstein as an admission of its author’s own guilt at practicing 
a creative impulse that was deemed not just unseemly, but impossible for a woman to wield.  
However, it is also possible to read the novel as a critique of male-centred creativity by 
providing a warning that writing may just be as messy as birth is, if in a different way, for, 
although Victor Frankenstein is a man, he falls prey to the same irrational passions that the 
“weaker” sex is said to be prone to.   
 
What is more, after abandoning the Creature to fend for himself right after his moment of 
‘birth,’ Frankenstein eschews his responsibility as a ‘father’ or a ‘mother’.  The Creature’s 
unremitting vengeance for his abandonment, coupled with the desolation of solitude, are 
used by Frankenstein as ‘evidence’ for the Creature’s monstrosity, but this is premised on 
the inaugural event of the Creature’s conception, for which Frankenstein knows he is 
responsible.  The novel raises many ethical questions, not least of which is in regard to 
parents being held responsible for their children’s behaviour or authors being held 
responsible for the effects of their works.  For, lest we forget, the philosophical works of 
Nietzsche have been held accountable for Hitler’s ideas regarding the supremacy of the 
German people and J. D. Salinger’s novel, The Catcher in the Rye (1951) has similarly been 
blamed for many attempted and successful assassinations carried out in the US between its 
publication and the 1980s.  In either sense, what is clear is that the Creature, his conception, 
and his birth, act as a warning against assuming that what we create is under our control.  
Just as Frankenstein is interpreted in varying ways, in ways that may not suit its author’s 
intent, the outcome of all our creative endeavours may be hard to predict and may produce 
monsters.  Finally, the novel also warns that any attempts to restrict or regulate autonomy 
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‘I had to remake myself. I had to unmake myself.'  Mental Illness 
and its Treatment in the Literature of Anne Enright 
Dr Michelle Kennedy 
 
Mental illness has been, and continues to remain, a complex issue in modern Irish society. 
Research, published in October 2013 by the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland states that 
currently: 
 
by the age of 13 years, 1 in 3 young people in Ireland is likely to have experienced 
some type of mental disorder.  By the age of 24 years, that rate will have increased 
to over 1 in 2.  Based on international evidence, that means that over one half of 
young Irish adults are at increased risk of mental ill health into their adult years. 
(Cannon et al, 2013: 7) 
 
Given the prevalence of mental ill-health in modern Irish society, it is evident that the way in 
which individuals with mental health difficulties are represented, identified, and treated will 
have a dramatic and influential impact on a significant section of Irish society.  However, 
despite numerous media campaigns and awareness programmes, it is evident that issues 
surrounding mental illness, and the treatment of mental illness, have remained, to a certain 
degree, taboo in modern Irish society.   
 
Anne Enright’s work engages repeatedly with issues surrounding mental health and ill-
health. Through her prolific body of work, Enright has, both in latent and more direct ways, 
brought issues surrounding mental illness to the fore, bringing an engaged, sympathetic and 
empathetic voice to an issue which has long remained hidden in Irish society.  In an 
interview with Shirley Kelly in 2002, Enright stated that ‘looking at what happens to people, 
and how you can come undone…that’s very much the job of the novelist’ (Enright 2002: 
236). Her work reflects, in many ways, what Lacan reminds us, that ‘madness is a 
phenomenon of thought’, and enables the repressed voices of individuals suffering from 
mental health difficulties or depression to be brought to the fore in Irish society (Lacan 2006: 
132). An analysis of extracts from Anne Enright’s fictional and non-fiction work through the 
lens of French literary theorists provides an insight into the lived experience of individuals 
suffering from depression or mental illness.  Theorists such as Michel Foucault and Julia 
Kristeva have explored the discourses, silences, power relations and cultural dictates that 
have surrounded, and indeed continue to surround, mental illness and those who experience 
it. Kristeva characterises melancholia as symptomatic of ‘inhibition and asymbolia that 
becomes established now and then or chronically in a person’ (Kristeva 1989:9).  Michel 
Foucault’s exploration of mental illness, its interpretation, and treatment in Madness and 
Civilisation highlights a traditional desire to silence and confine individuals suffering from 
mental illness or distress, a desire to separate those deemed to be ‘abnormal’ or different 
from the remainder of society.  Foucault therefore highlights the socially constructed nature 
of madness, something which Enright’s work similarly focuses upon.  Enright’s writing 
highlights the way in which individuals in modern Irish society are similarly silenced and 
separated from society at large.  Enright’s work subtly yet powerfully points out the ways in 
which individuals with mental health difficulties can be silenced and confined through 
language, in many ways framed to be the ‘distant soul’ which Julia Kristeva speaks of in her 
work Black Sun (1996a: 79).  In both her fictional writing in novels such as What Are You 
Like? and The Gathering and her non-fiction work Making Babies: Stumbling into 
Motherhood, Enright explores the very way in which modern Irish society speaks of mental 
illness and speaks out in relation to the realities of living with and beyond mental illness in 
modern Ireland.  
This article examines Enright’s work in light of Foucault’s argument of the socially 
constructed nature of madness and Julia Kristeva’s examination of the concept of 
melancholia and in particular, her call to raise melancholia to ‘the level of words – and of life’ 
(Kristeva 1996a: 80). These two lenses are not incompatible, insofar as both theorists seek 
to examine the ways in which individuals with mental health difficulties are distanced and 
separated from mainstream society, and the importance of language in framing mental 
illness in modern society. By utilising the theories of these writers, in conjunction with 
Enright’s work, a deeper insight into the discourse and power relations surrounding mental 
ill-health can be gained.  In so doing, this article seeks to locate the importance of Enright’s 
work in highlighting mental health issues in Ireland and in furthering a growing discourse and 
engagement with mental illness, and depression, in the public sphere and consciousness. 
 
  
Silence and Labels 
 
Enright’s writing is littered with both direct and in-direct references to mental illness, and to 
its place and perception in modern Irish society. Throughout her novels and short stories, 
Enright highlights the traditional silence surrounding mental ill-health and depression in Irish 
society, demonstrating the tendency to utilise euphemism and dissimulation when discussing 
mental health issues, or speaking of individuals suffering from mental ill-health or 
depression. This tendency is glimpsed briefly in Enright’s novel The Gathering when 
Veronica, the main protagonist, recalls being sent to live temporarily with her grandmother in 
order to allow her mother to recover from an illness which could be interpreted as a nervous 
breakdown: 
 
this was the year that we were farmed out to Ada, me and Liam and Kitty, and we did 
not see our mother, not even for Christmas, though our father did arrive with a smug-
looking Bea some time in the afternoon. ‘Mammy’s still not herself,’ she said, looking 
extra pious in her new tank top, a mohair thing in stripes of raspberry and blue 
(Enright 2007: 86) 
 
Veronica’s sister’s assertion that ‘Mammy’s still not herself’ is an interesting euphemism for 
mental illness or distress.  It insinuates a division of the self, a separation or marginalisation 
of Mammy from her real or true ‘self’.  Veronica’s mother is labelled as unwell, yet no further 
discussion is entered into by any of her family members.  Rather than engaging directly with 
the issue of mental illness which affects their family in such a profound manner, the Hegartys 
cope with their mother’s distress by categorising her as ill, whilst avoiding any interaction 
with the root causes of her distress.  Veronica’s mother is defined as ill and abnormal, yet 
her ill-health and its causes remain relatively unclassified and unconsidered by her family.  
As Nicole Hurt states in her article Disciplining through Depression: An Analysis of 
Contemporary Discourse on Women and Depression: 
 
Depression greatly varies from individual to individual, but medicalization posits it as 
a uniform disorder—one that is based on ‘biology’ and not the specific situation. 
When the content of women’s discontent is overlooked, the unique and complex 
circumstances that led to these experiences are silenced in the name of medicine 
(Hurt, 2007: 306) 
 
In much the same way as individuals with mental health issues were classified under various 
universally understood euphemisms, institutionalisation too was often discussed in hushed 
tones, using similarly vague language.  Individuals who were temporarily institutionalised 
were often described as ‘being away for a while’, while being in ‘Clonmel’, ‘Ballinasloe’ or 
‘the Gorman’ were popular euphemisms for institutionalisation.37  This is evident in The 
Gathering, when Veronica recalls a childhood visit to see her Uncle Brendan in St. Ita’s 
                                               
37
 Terms such as ‘being sent away’, being ‘in the Gorman’, Clonmel or Ballinasloe, were universally understood 
as signifiers of containment or confinement within a psychiatric institution in Ireland in the twentieth century. 
mental institution, with her Grandmother Ada and brother Liam.  Whilst waiting for the bus 
which would take them to the institution, Ada, Veronica and Liam were offered a lift by a 
passing stranger.  The man asks Ada if they were ‘going to the hospital?’ to which Ada 
replies: 
 
‘St Ita’s, yes,’ on a long exhalation.  The stranger lets it lie, this heavy word now 
beside us in the car.  He is not going as far as the gates, he says; he will let us down 
near enough.  It is his habit, evidently, to pick people up at this bus stop, and I know 
by the way he says ‘hospital’ that St Ita’s is not a hospital.  If we were going to a 
hospital, then Ada would have said (Enright, 2007: 113) 
 
The unspoken understanding that flows between Ada and the driver, and which Veronica, at 
such a tender age, begins to grasp, is indicative of the discomfort which was, and is, felt by 
many people when discussing mental illness and its treatment.  Just as the driver is not 
‘going as far as the gates’ of the institution, thus perhaps physically avoiding the building and 
its associations, he also linguistically avoids directly engaging in a conversation with Ada 
about the institution, or her reasons for visiting it.  This behaviour is mimicked by Ada, who 
seems as eager to remain silent on the subject.  St. Ita’s, in this instance, becomes a 
universally understood label which negates, in many respects, the need for further 
questioning. 
 
This equivocal language is also evident in Enright’s novel What Are You Like?, when Evelyn, 
step-mother to one of the main protagonists, Maria, muses upon her step-daughter’s 
recovery from a depressive episode.  Following her discharge from hospital, Maria takes up 
employment as an attendant in a ladies’ dressing room in a shop in the local town.  Her 
father, Berts, does not travel into town to see her, but Evelyn visits Maria often at work ‘for 
the barest of reasons’ (Enright, 2001: 66).  
 
At least she was able to hold her head up in front of the neighbours and say, when 
asked, that Maria was between things. That is what you said about children these 
days, that they were between things – you did not say that this was the place they 
had ended up (Enright, 2001: 66) 
 
Once again, euphemistic language is used to classify Maria’s condition, and Evelyn, in this 
instance, appears to be more concerned with ensuring that her daughter’s recovery and 
return to the workplace is couched in socially-acceptable terms, than with offering any 
consideration of the root cause of Maria’s depressive episode.  In fact Evelyn is seen to feel 
quite uncomfortable with the upheaval that Maria’s depression and abrupt return home has 
caused, and this is emphasised in the way in which she describes Maria’s attempt to recover 
and move on in the aftermath of her depressive episode: 
 
Maria…was waiting for something and Evelyn did not know what it was. Every couple 
of weeks she came in to see if she had found it yet and each time she came into the 
shop she hoped to find her gone (Enright, 2001: 63) 
 
Despite the fact that Maria does not behave, or express herself, in a socially unacceptable 
manner in the aftermath of her breakdown, Evelyn appears to be overwhelmed with anxiety 
concerning her step-daughter’s potential for embarrassment or even perhaps relapse, and 
has little difficulty with expressing a private desire to distance her step-daughter, or perhaps 
more specifically her step-daughter’s illness, from herself and from the remainder of her 
family.  For Evelyn, Maria has become defined by her mental illness. Despite the fact that 
she has undergone treatment and is beginning to reframe her life and live independently, 
Maria’s identity cannot be separated from her illness in her step-mother’s eyes.  She 
becomes an individual to be monitored, an individual whose identity must be tailored to 
conform to the expectations of the ‘neighbours’ and, by extension, to those of Irish society at 
large.  Evelyn’s hope, that one day she would visit Maria at work only to find her gone, is 
also significant.  It perhaps reflects a hope that, should Maria distance herself or become 
physically marginalised from the local community, that Evelyn could reframe her situation in 
what she believes to be more socially acceptable terms, thereby avoiding the shame or 
negative label that she feels Maria’s illness brings upon the family.   
 
Evelyn’s fear for her step-daughter’s mental health is clearly linked to societal definitions of 
normalcy and abnormality and the incumbent social inclusion and exclusion which often 
accompany such societal definitions.  Her attempts to reframe Maria’s mental health and 
identity in a more positive light socially highlights the importance which Evelyn places upon 
being defined as ‘normal’ within modern Irish society, and her need to distance both her 
step-daughter, and indeed her entire family from any societal implication of illness or 
abnormality. 
 
Alongside her fictional work, Enright also draws upon her own personal experiences with 
depression to explore and critique the classification and categorisation of those deemed to 
be mentally ill.  In a book review entitled ‘Fuzzy Edges’, Enright compares late pregnancy 
and depression, claiming that:  
 
The only difference between late pregnancy and depression that I can think of is that 
loss of a sense of self – at nine months, you feel like a vegetable; when depressed, 
you feel like a very important vegetable, or a hugely worthless one (Enright, 2003: 
50).  
 
It is interesting to note here that Enright appears to be engaging in the type of categorisation 
and labelling of depressed individuals similar to what is evident in The Gathering.  However, 
in this instance, Enright could be viewed as appropriating a label (in this case that of 
‘vegetable’), and using it to expand current societal discussions centring on mental illness.  
Having had previous personal experience of depression, Enright, as an author, can be 
viewed as aiding societal understanding and awareness of depression and indeed of other 
mental illnesses by categorising and explaining her own personal feelings in relation to her 
experience of the illness.  Lacan makes the point, in Écrits, that the ‘absence of speech is 
manifested in madness by the stereotype of a discourse in which the subject…is spoken 
instead of speaking’ (2006: 231-232).  Lacan highlights here the difficulty experienced by 
many individuals experiencing mental ill-health, in distancing themselves from traditional 
definitions of and discourses surrounding mental illness, and appropriating the space in 
which to outline and voice their own personal narrative on the subject.  Enright, in many 
ways, appropriates this space, utilising her own personal experiences of depression to re-
appropriate the discourse of mental illness, and in the process also re-appropriating the 
labels associated with mental illness.  Also, by associating the feelings experienced by 
mothers in the latter stages of pregnancy with those experienced by individuals touched by 
depression, Enright is, to a certain degree, re-appropriating societal conceptions and 
stereotypes concerning mental illness, and making them comparable to an un-stigmatized, 
and much cherished, human experience.  
 
Julia Kristeva, in an interview with Dominique Grisoni, stated that ‘in the broadest sense of 
the term…we speak of melancholia as a “distant soul”’ (Kristeva 1996a:79). Through her re-
appropriation of the certain labels associated with mental illness, Enright’s work attempts to 
bridge the gap between these distant souls and mainstream Irish society in order to de-
stigmatise the experience of mental illness and alter the perception of, and labels associated 
with, mental illness in modern Ireland.  This personal engagement with her readers on the 
subject of living with and experiencing mental illness or depression, which she outlines in a 
more in-depth manner in Making Babies, represents an attempt to voice the feelings and 
experiences of women living and coping with mental illness in modern Irish society. 
 
In her non-fiction work, Making Babies, Enright also challenges and critiques modern 
Ireland’s continued persistence in categorising individuals as either ‘normal’ or else ‘mentally 
ill’ or ‘unstable’ based upon their outward appearance or on their ability to conform to 
societal norms and dictates.  At one point in the book she asks the reader to: 
 
Look at that lovely woman in the school playground with her lovely children, all 
scrubbed; the girl in florals, the boy with a baseball hat turned cutely back to front.  
Normal – ostentatiously so, a pillar of propriety, a devoted mother, the very linchpin 
of society.  While chatting about this and that, she says, ‘Oh, I wouldn’t let them into 
the garden . . .’ and you have a choice of asking why, or backing slowly away.  She 
is, you realise, completely, fragrantly, bonkers. And not only bonkers, but justified. 
She could talk about the state of your living-room for a week… (Enright 2005: 159) 
 
While this observation is undeniably humorous, it also serves to make a powerful and 
pertinent point about the way in which mental illness is perceived and identified in modern 
Irish society.  Foucault argues, in Madness and Civilisation, that madness:  
 
is judged only by its acts; it is not accused of intentions, nor are its secrets to be 
fathomed. Madness is responsible only for that part of itself which is visible. All the 
rest is reduced to silence. Madness no longer exists except as seen (Foucault 1967: 
250) 
 
Enright, through her humorous critique of manifestations of madness or mental illness, 
emphasises the point, made by Foucault, that one is only deemed to be, and thus labelled, 
mentally ill or touched in Irish society, if one is seen to be mentally ill.  Latently, through her 
humorous diatribe, Enright emphasises the link, even in modern Irish society, between being 
deemed normal or indeed abnormal or mentally ill, based upon one’s ability to conform to 
societal norms or dictates.  In an era which has championed the closure of traditional sites of 
psychiatric institutionalisation and confinement, Enright’s work charts the emergence of 
linguistic walls to replace the physical walls of the asylum which no longer contain the 
mentally ill.  These linguistic walls serve to maintain a distance between the ‘touched’ and 
mainstream Irish society through categorisation and judgement.  In this manner her work 
critiques society’s passive acceptance of labels such as ‘normal’ or ‘mentally ill’ without 
consideration for the complexities which complicate any attempt to simplistically label any 
individual.  
 
Living with Mental Illness/Depression in Modern Irish Society 
 
Michel Foucault argues that the ‘science of mental disease, as it would develop in the 
asylum, would always be only of the order of observation and classification.  It would not be 
a dialogue’ (Foucault 1967: 250). Whilst classification, categorisation and observation of, 
rather than interaction with, those deemed mentally ill has arguably typified Irish societal 
responses to individuals with mental health difficulties, Enright’s writing challenges the 
reader to hear their voices and to engage in a dialogue with and about mental illness, in 
order to bridge the societal distance and alienation arguably imposed upon those deemed to 
be mentally ill or depressed.  One of the most thought-provoking ways in which Enright’s 
work achieves this is by providing characters labelled as ‘abnormal’ or mentally ill in her work 
the space and freedom to elucidate the reality of living and coping daily with mental illness.  
This provides these individuals with an opportunity to reframe their own identity; namely to 
classify their own condition and how it effects their identity, rather than passively accepting 
the labels which Irish society imposes upon them. 
 
One could argue that Enright’s novel The Gathering provides a detailed and complex insight 
into the complexities of living and attempting to come to terms with depression in modern 
Irish society. The novel chronicles the struggle of the main protagonist, Veronica Hegarty, to 
come to terms with the suicide of her brother Liam, and to acknowledge the repressed 
memories that this tragic event has brought forward, concerning the sexual abuse of Liam by 
her grandmother’s landlord, which she witnessed first-hand, years previously.  While it must 
be stated that Veronica, is never diagnosed with a mental illness, her grief, coupled with 
insomnia, excessive and solitary drinking, self-imposed isolation and feelings of inadequacy 
and marginalisation from close family, could be interpreted as symptoms of a deep 
depression experienced in the wake of her brother’s suicide.  Interestingly, Veronica never 
seeks familial or medical help to cope with the terrible mental anguish that she experiences 
in the wake of Liam’s suicide, nor does she admit outwardly the depths of her despair at any 
point during the novel, highlighting perhaps the overarching silence that accompanies many 
instances of depression in modern Irish society.  As such, The Gathering can be interpreted 
as Enright’s attempt to represent the mindset, and struggles, of a deeply depressed woman, 
who utilises a self-imposed writing therapy in an attempt to come to terms with the distress 
that she is experiencing as a result of her childhood experiences, her familial struggles and 
her bereavement.  Carol Dell’Amico attests that:   
 
Although the novel seems to concern itself with the past, it is firmly rooted in the 
boom-period present of Veronica’s response to Liam’s suicide, a response that is 
something like a nervous breakdown and which threatens her marriage. Shifting 
restlessly between past and present, Veronica’s story’s main focus is, finally, 
Veronica herself, her crisis and her recovery (Dell’Amico 2010: 63-64) 
 
While Dell’Amico’s article focuses primarily on Veronica’s attempt to remember and bear 
witness to the traumatic events of Liam’s childhood, rather than Veronica’s struggles with her 
mental health, Dell’Amico’s comment demonstrates an acknowledgment that Veronica’s 
struggle with depression or mental ill-health is a cornerstone of the novels focus.  
 
Throughout much of the novel, Veronica admits to feelings of inadequacy, blame and 
insignificance, particularly relation to her interactions with close family. In the aftermath of 
Liam’s suicide Veronica admits that: 
 
There is something wonderful about a death, how everything shuts down, and all the 
ways you thought you were vital are not even vaguely important.  Your husband can 
feed the kids, he can work the new oven, he can find the sausages in the 
fridge…And the girls will be picked up from school, and dropped off again in the 
morning.  Your eldest daughter can remember her inhaler, and your youngest will 
take her gym kit with her, and it is just as you suspected – most of the stuff that you 
do is just stupid, really stupid, most of the stuff you do is just nagging and whining 
and picking up for people who are too lazy even to love you, even that, let alone find 
their own shoes under their own bed; people who turn and accuse you – scream at 
you sometimes – when they can only find one shoe (Enright, 2007: 27) 
 
Veronica’s admission, that she is ‘not even vaguely important’, represents a distortion of her 
reality and a loss of self-esteem that makes her feel profoundly isolated from her family.  
Through this passage, Veronica demonstrates to the reader how difficult it is, both to remain 
connected to one’s family, and to live from day to day, when an individual suffers from 
depression.  Veronica’s mental state even hampers her relationship with her children.  She 
limits the time that they may spend watching television as she believes that ‘If I don’t talk to 
them I think I will die of something – call it irrelevance – I think I will just fade away’ (Enright, 
2007: 37-38).  It could be stated that the perspective from which the novel is written 
facilitates its demonstration of the realities of living with mental illness or depression in a 
modern Irish context.  The novel is written entirely from Veronica’s perspective and the 
reader may question whether Veronica’s family truly isolate, marginalise and blame her for 
the litany of faults of which she believes herself to be culpable.  However, what is perhaps 
being highlighted in this work is the unimportance of the veracity of Veronica’s claim.  
Whether her isolation and culpability is being fostered by her family or not, Veronica’s mental 
state encourages her to perceive her situation in this manner.  In this way, the novel clearly 
illustrates the loneliness and isolation that can be felt by individuals suffering from 
depression and mental illness, even if they are surrounded by a loving support system.  This 
is evident in Veronica’s admission that: 
 
I can not feel the weight of my body on the bed. I can not feel the line of my skin 
along the sheet.  I am swinging an inch or so off the mattress, and I do not believe in 
myself – in the way I breathe or turn – and I do not believe in Tom beside me…Or 
that he loves me.  Or that any of our memories are mutual.  So he lies there, 
separate, while I lose faith. (Enright, 2007: 133) 
 
Veronica’s language here is indicative of her perceived marginalisation. Her inability to 
connect with, touch or feel her own body, or the body of her husband, highlights Veronica’s 
separation, not only from her husband and family, but even from her own body and the 
physical world around her.  
  
Despite the anguish and depression that threatens her mental state, familial relationships 
and marriage, Veronica is seen, by the novel’s close, to come to an understanding of her 
current mental health, and to make the decision to seek help in order to deal with the root 
causes of her distress.  Veronica admits, at one point in the novel, to being ‘in the horrors’, 
however she remains, for the most part, silent about the extent and nature of her grief and 
depression (Enright 2007: 133).  Her decision, at the novel’s conclusion, to break the silence 
and secrecy surrounding the sexual abuse of her brother as a child, represents an 
acknowledgement of how deeply affected she has become by the secret that she has carried 
since childhood, and her willingness to accept discourse and intimate discussion as a 
therapeutic aid, in order to combat her depressive feelings and tear down the emotional wall 
of silence that has existed between Veronica and her husband and siblings:  
 
I know what I have to do…I will tell the truth. I will get hold of Ernest and tell him what 
happened to Liam in Broadstone, and I will ask him to break this very old news to the 
rest of the family (but don’t tell Mammy!) because I can not do it myself... (Enright, 
2007: 259)   
 
Veronica’s decision in this regard represents an acknowledgement that her current feelings 
and mental state can be altered, and that the isolation, fear and guilt that she currently feels 
need not be a permanent element of her life.  Enright brings Veronica’s story to a close by 
bringing her to an emotional crossroads, enabling her to look past her current anguish and 
toward her desires for the future, which are closely linked to a desire to find an emotional 
equilibrium: 
 
…I do not want a different destiny from the one that has brought me here. I do not 
want a different life.  I just want to be able to live it, that’s all. I want to wake up in the 
morning and fall asleep at night.  I want to make love to my husband again. (Enright, 
2007: 260) 
 
This statement highlights Veronica’s belief that change is both possible and desired; that her 
internal struggles can be worked upon in order to attain a greater sense of mental health and 
well-being.  The very fact that the novel closes before Veronica’s return home is significant, 
as the reader will never know if Veronica is able to move on and live her life in the aftermath 
of divulging her secret.  However, Enright’s novel depicts the possibility and hope that one 
can learn to cope with and survive mental illness or depression, whilst similarly 
foregrounding the argument that women do not necessarily need to conform to societal 
dictates concerning ideal mental health in order to maintain active and positive familial and 
public roles in modern Irish society.  Veronica outlines this belief quite frankly in The 
Gathering when she states: 
 
…there is no worse place for me to go.  This is the worst place there is. In which 
case, it is not too bad. If this is as mad as I get then it is not too mad.  My children will 
not be harmed by it; though I may have to change my life a little; get out more, trade 
in the Saab (Enright, 2007: 237-238) 
 
Veronica’s assertion that her situation ‘is not too bad’ is indicative of an acceptance of the 
fact that her current mental state does not conform to societal ideals concerning sanity and 
mental health, which may ‘remain forever beyond’ her reach, whilst simultaneously exhibiting 
a distinct confidence that her depression is controllable (Hurt, 2007: 305).  Veronica 
understands and freely admits that her mental distress affects certain elements in her life, 
yet she refuses to allow it to socially or personally disempower her.  Veronica’s desire, by 
the end of the novel, is perhaps, not to permanently exorcise her mental demons, arguably 
an impossible goal, but rather, as she states herself, ‘to be less afraid’ (Enright, 2007: 261).  
Her decision to return and take up her active and prominent familial role at the end of the 
novel represents ‘a major step toward recovering a lost equilibrium’, implying an ability to live 
daily with depression and mental illness, rather than simply living despite it (Dell’Amico, 
2010: 72).  Whilst Veronica may never fully recover her equilibrium, she nonetheless will not 
allow her mental state to isolate her or deny her a full and active life.  
 
While Anne Enright writes prolifically in her fictional work about the realities of living with 
depression and mental illness, discussion of Enright’s exploration of mental illness in a 
modern Irish context would not be complete without evaluating her detailed and frank 
account of her own personal experience of living with depression, which she outlines in her 
memoir Making Babies.  Through this work Enright details her experience of living with, 
treating and indeed living beyond depression in modern Irish society.  In a latent criticism, 
perhaps, of attempts to write about mental illness, Enright admits that: 
 
It is easy to write nice sentences about this kind of thing, but depression functions in 
the place where people hate both themselves and other people.  It attracts 
complication, paranoia, impossibility, slippages, sneering, and pride.  These 
emotions are ragged and infectious; they happen, not only inside you, but between 
you and everyone else in the room.  The depressive think that they are self-
contained, but they never stop leaking misery, banality, and hatred – because it is 
also a dull state as everyone knows, a grey old thing (Enright, 2005: 188). 
 
In her memoir Making Babies, Enright chronicles the help sought and treatment she received 
for her depression, alongside the author’s observations concerning her attempt to come to 
terms with a debilitating illness and thence to rebuild her life, and as such provide an insight 
into the difficulties associated with maintaining a sense of identity in the wake of diagnosis, 
and the intense struggle to regain a powerful and independent sense of self in the aftermath 
of a breakdown. This struggle is evident in Enright’s consideration of the term: 
 
Sick. Well. It was all a new language for me. How long before you don’t have 
feelings, just symptoms, just a direction…‘up’ or ‘down’…I had to remake myself.  I 
had to unmake myself.  I was a bunch of chemicals.  I was a dog that had to be 
walked, or it would bite.  I had to be careful with myself, like a trusted cup that you 
carry to the table as a child and do not spill.  I had to think about power – because I 
was surrounded by the powerless.  I was one of them.  I had lost, discarded (Enright, 
2005: 192). 
 
Enright’s discourse latently emphasises the tendency to interpret and classify mentally ill 
individuals as little more than a product of the symptoms which they manifest.  Her  
admission that she was ‘one of them’, is indicative of the dehumanisation and isolation that 
can be experienced by individuals labelled as mentally ill, a situation which Enright combats 
through an active engagement with her own sense of self, and attempt to regain a sense of 
personal power and sense of that self.  In this way, her writing can be linked to the assertion 
made by Julia Kristeva, in an interview with Suzanne Clark and Kathleen Hulley; that there 
are two alternative ways which a subject can interpret his or her crisis’ or mental illness, 
‘either it can be viewed as ‘a suffering’, ‘a pathology’, or alternatively as ‘a creation, a 
renewal’ (Kristeva, 1996b: 37).  Enright, through her personal portrayal of emotional crisis, 
postulates the possibility of renewal, of beginning afresh, whilst taking account of the life-
lessons learnt by one’s experience of mental illness and/or emotional crisis.  She chronicles 
this decision in Making Babies when she states that: 
 
There is a certain ruthlessness about a recovering depressive, and like alcoholics we 
are never cured.  It takes rigour.  No sharp knives.  No breakages of the skin.  No 
baths after nightfall.  No pockets.  No rocks.  You must learn to accept many things: 
that mornings are like this.  That some days you will not leave the house…For six 
months, the medication turned all my thoughts into symptoms, and made me 
question everything about who I was.  It dismantled my personality.  The chemical 
happiness that crept up on me was not a joyful one, but it kept me alive, and after a 
while I came to appreciate the soggy buzz of it.  I had a place to stand.  When I was 
able to think again, I would make decisions.  I would change the circumstances of my 
life, and so give life itself a chance to return (Enright, 2005: 193) 
 
Like Veronica in The Gathering, Enright’s personal account serves to point out the 
incompatibility of societal dictates and norms concerning ‘ideal mental health’, and the daily 
lived experience of many individuals in Irish society, and her writing questions the need, 
even to feign conformity to these unattainable ideals. By foregrounding the reality of living 
with, and beyond mental ill-health, Enright’s writing challenges the reader to deconstruct the 
terminology surrounding mental health in Irish society.  It provides the reader with a multi-
faceted view of mental health and ill-health which recognises a myriad of ways in which an 
individual can live with, cope and live beyond mental illness. This is exemplified at the close 
of Making Babies, when Enright admits that: 
 
I’m still a bit odd.  I don’t go out a lot.  I have an occasional ability to attract people’s 
obsessions or to smell out their damage.  So I like a bit of distance.  I keep my small 
paranoias, a little armoury of them – a quiet, but highly resistant, neurosis about 
opening or posting letters, for example, and a fairly odd approach to the whole issue 
of getting my hair cut.  But maybe that’s doing all right, for forty.  And on the plus side 




Nicole Hurt states that: 
 
In today's society, it seems plausible to think that the stigma that once plagued 
depression may have been obliterated due to the significant number of people who 
now suffer from the disorder.  Yet, do the ways in which we currently conceive of 
women's depression really differ from the intense stigmas of the past?  How do we 
talk about women's depression?  Is this discourse empowering and encouraging for 
women?  Or, do we…stifle women's depression and keep it confined to the private 
and taboo site of misunderstood madness? (2007: 285) 
 
Enright’s work aids in de-stigmatising mental illness in Irish society through its open and 
frank portrayal of both fictional characters suffering from mental illness, and through her own 
struggles with depression.  Through these portrayals and memoirs, Enright provides an 
empowering and encouraging discourse, which details the ways which individuals, suffering 
from a mental illness or depression, can move forward and develop ways with which to live 
with their illness in a positive manner, despite being profoundly affected by their illness.  
Julia Kristeva makes the point that ‘one could describe melancholia as an unnamable and 
empty perversion’, and goes on to challenge us as a society ‘to raise it to the level of words 
– and of life’ (Kristeva 1996a: 80). Enright has succeeded in raising melancholia to the ‘level 
of words - and of life’ by providing open and honest portrayal of both her personal 
experience of depression and her fictional characters experience of mental illness, which 
serves to add a new and complex dimension to the emerging discourse centring on mental 
illness in modern Irish society. 
 
Foucault argues that individuals, and society at large, ‘confine their neighbors [sic], and 
communicate and recognize each other through the merciless language of non-madness’ 
(Foucault, 1967: ix).  Enright’s writing enables those who are confined, by the categorisation 
and isolation engendered by traditional discourses surrounding mental illness, to in some 
way free themselves through discourse itself, by voicing their lived experience of mental 
illness, and by providing alternative perspectives that will promote a dialogue centring on 
mental illness in modern Irish society.  Similarly, Enright’s work strives to assess modern 
societal challenges and prescriptions levelled at Irish women.  As Hurt argues contemporary 
discourse encourages women to engage in ‘self-discipline and self-monitoring’, not solely in 
relation to their bodies, but also in relation to ‘ideal mental health’ (2007: 305).  She argues 
that ‘despite women’s efforts to achieve the ideal mental health, just like the ideal femininity, 
it will remain forever beyond their reach’ (Hurt, 2007: 305).  Enright’s work calls into question 
societal delineations of mental health, by demonstrating that modern Irish women can take 
an active and independent role in Irish society without having to attain, or even feign 
achievement of, modern Irish society’s definition of ‘ideal mental health’. Through the 
experiences of the fictional character Veronica, and Enright’s own frank discussion of her 
own battle with depression, Enright’s writing provides a positive and life-affirming view of 
living with and beyond mental ill-health, a view which disavows the need to continually 
correspond to traditional delineations of what is ‘normal’ or ‘socially acceptable’ behaviour in 
order to be deemed mentally well. Through her exploration of the place and position of 
individuals with mental health difficulties in modern Irish society, Enright’s work succeeds, in 
many ways, in achieving what Foucault terms ‘the mediation of madness, through which the 
world becomes culpable, compelled by it to a task of recognition, or reparation, to the task of 
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CALL FOR PAPERS – (IN)VISIBLE LINES  
Sibéal Journal, Vol 2  
 
Following on from the success of our 2015 conference we are looking for submissions for 
our next journal. Papers are invited to engage with the theme of the conference, (In)visible 
Lines. We are also accepting feminist or gender studies book reviews. The books must have 
been published since November 2015.  
 
The journal will focus on how the feminist movement has been categorised as a series of 
different waves, first, second and third, with some contemporary critics suggesting we are 
now on the precipice of a fourth wave. Each of these stages had their own aims and means 
of achieving those aims: underlying all was a quest for equality, for some or for all.  
 
Increasingly this neat categorization of the feminist movement has been questioned and 
challenged, especially with the internet age offering a greater platform of communication for 
female-identified individuals and feminists alike.  
 
Visible and invisible barriers remain, whilst new forms of inequality and oppression emerge 
or are simply acknowledged. Different identities intersect and cannot be easily separated, 
further complicating feminist struggles. Despite these challenges, now is an exciting time for 
feminist and gender studies. New mediums present new opportunities, old battles take new 
forms. Masculinities and femininities are no longer defined as rigid categories they once 
were, gender identities are challenged and the waves of feminism have begun to blur. 
 
Please send extended abstracts of 500 words to invisiblelines2015@gmail.com by April 25, 











Sibéal was formed in 2006 by Susan Cahill and Claire Bracken, postgraduate students at 
that time who were responding to the great need for an organisation that focused on feminist 
and gender studies on the island of Ireland. We are now nine years in operation and aim to 
continue creating networking opportunities for postgraduate students and early career 
researchers.  
 
Our current committee is enthusiastic to carry on the task of encouraging members to share 
their work and avail of the variety of opportunities in this field. If you have any questions or 
comments, please feel free to email us info@sibeal.ie 
 
Annual Conference – November 2016 
Revolutionary Genders NUI Galway November 18 & 19  
Email: revolutionarygenders2016@gmail.com 
Deadline for submissions: September 21, 2016 
 
The quest for equality always involves change, sometimes revolutionary change. This change, this 
revolution can be slow, living in the shadows, waiting for the moment to strike. Or it can be loud, 
visible and quick. Either way the landscape is changed. In the wake of a revolution what remains? 
What is left behind? What changes? And for whom? What compromises are made? 
 
On the 100 year anniversary of the 1916 Rising equality is still a major issue. Gender recognition and 
rights could define our next 100 years. Has the gender revolution been written into the history books? 
How will gender be defined? How does this history manifest itself in culture, in history, in literature, in 
society, in law? What is the difference between revolution and sustainable transformation?As the 
revolution continues we must both look back, but continue to move forward. 
 
The conference hopes to explore how definitions have changed, how revolution happens, and how 
the landscape can change within feminism and gender studies. Influenced by the 1916 Rising we 
hope to engage and inspire postgraduate and early career researchers from all disciplines to 
showcase their creative and innovative approaches. 
 
We hope to facilitate practical and theoretical based projects, and encourage researchers to submit 
panels, proposals for workshops, round tables, feminist performances or exhibitions. 
 
Themes might include but need not be limited to the following: 
Revolution and Change  
Waking the feminists  
Gender identities in transformation  
Gender and Politics  
Historical identities  
Gender embodiment  
Gender performativity  
Post-colonial identities  
’Postfeminism’  
Intersectionality  
Space, Place and Gender  
Gender and Language  
Gender and Religion  
Medical identities, medicalized bodies  
LGBTQIA  
Institutions in flux  
Gender and Work  
Feminism(s)  
Masculinities  
Gender and Migration  
Gender and Sexuality  
Sociology, History, History of Art, Theatre, Popular Culture, Music, Law, Politics 
Anthropology, etc. 
 
Abstracts or proposals of no more than 250 words should be completed on the template available 
here or on Sibéal.ie. We are in the position to offer a selection of travel bursaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
